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INTRODUCTION

In Massachusetts v. EPA (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the Clean Air Act ("CAA") to require the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to regulate greenhouse gas emissions1 from
motor vehicles if the EPA Administrator finds that the emissions
endanger public health and welfare ("Endangerment Finding"). 2 In
December 2009, the Administrator made such an Endangerment
Finding,3 obligating the EPA to work with the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA") to develop average fuel
economy and greenhouse gas emission standards for new light-duty
vehicles. After issuing proposals and reviewing comments from the
public, the two agencies announced their groundbreaking final
regulation ("Tailpipe Rule") in May 2010. 4 The regulation of
greenhouse gases from mobile sources under the CAA, however,
triggered further greenhouse gas permit requirements for some
stationary sources ("Triggering Interpretation").5 This prompted the
EPA to finalize permitting rules tailored to greenhouse gas emissions
from stationary sources ("Tailoring Rule"),6 spawning legal challenges.
This Note, at its heart, untangles the motivations behind an
important group involved in this litigation: the states.
Industry groups, environmental groups, and states filed more
than seventy lawsuits challenging or supporting at least one of the

1.
By "greenhouse gas emissions," this Note refers to the emissions of the six well-mixed
greenhouse gases: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons,
and sulfur hexafluoride. Greenhouse gas emissions are typically calculated on a carbon dioxide
equivalent basis, which is why this Note sometimes refers to carbon dioxide emissions.
2.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) ("If EPA makes a finding of
endangerment, the CAA requires the agency to regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant
from new motor vehicles."); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (allowing the Administrator to
in his judgment, such pollutants "may reasonably
regulate air pollutants from motor vehicles if,
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare").
3.
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Endangerment
Finding] ("The Administrator finds that six greenhouse gases taken in combination endanger
both the public health and the public welfare of current and future generations.").
4.
Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85-86,
600) [hereinafter Tailpipe Rule].
5.
Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by
Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified 40 C.F.R.
pts 50-51, 70-71) [hereinafter Triggering Interpretation].
6.
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75
Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51-52, 70-71) [hereinafter
Tailoring Rule].
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EPA's four actions, namely the Endangerment Finding, the Tailpipe7
Rule, the Triggering Interpretation, and the Tailoring Rule.
Significantly, thirty-seven states have either directly filed lawsuits or
requested to intervene in support of or against at least one of the four
actions." These lawsuits have been consolidated into three cases before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C.
Circuit"). 9 The litigation frenzy highlights a trend: states are
increasingly using the legal system to advance environmental goals. 10
State involvement in a lawsuit-whether as a party or as an
intervenor-can have significant consequences for environmental
litigation. Arguably, it can increase the resources available for the
7.
See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Robin Bravender, States Take Sides in Greenhouse Gas 'Endangerment'Brawl,
8.
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, http:llwww.nytimes.comlgwiret20lO/03/19119greenwire-states-takesides-in-greenhouse-gas-endangerme-29019.html; Gabriel Nelson, It's Red States vs. Blue in
Legal War Over EPA Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/10/12/
Nelson,
l2greenwire-its-red-states-vs-blue-in-legal-war-over-epa-g-99648.html?pagewanted=all.
id., however, relies on a Greenwire tally, available at http://www.eenews.net/special-reports/
climate-courts (last visited Oct. 12, 2011), that incorrectly categorizes Florida as requesting to
intervene in support of the EPA when Florida has actually requested to intervene in opposition
to the EPA. This Note focuses on the motivations behind states that joined as parties and states
that joined as intervenors, and it does not explore any differences in motivations that stem from
choosing one involvement procedure over the other.
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010)
9.
(cases on the Endangerment Finding); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1092
(D.C. Cir. May 7, 2010) (cases on the Tailpipe Rule); Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v.
EPA, No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (consolidated cases on the Triggering Interpretation
and the Tailoring Rule).
10. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009) (deciding
that plaintiffs claim seeking abatement of defendants' ongoing contributions to global warming
is permissible under federal common law of public nuisance), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011)
(reversing the Second Circuit on account of preemption); see also David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An
Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as
Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012) (describing how climate change litigation frequently involves
states on both sides of the battle); Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the
Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (describing how state
attorneys general are increasingly using the court system). Some administrative law scholars
believe Massachusetts v. EPA gave states special standing ("special solicitude") in lawsuits,
especially environmental lawsuits, which may explain the increased involvement. See, e.g.,
Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?:
Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701, 1701 (2008)
(arguing that the Supreme Court had given "greater standing rights to states than ordinary
citizens"); Andrew P. Morriss, Litigating to Regulate: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 193, 193 ("The Court rolled out the welcome mat for state
governments unhappy with a federal agency's decision, creating from whole cloth a new rule of
standing that allows states to gain a hearing in federal court with only the thinnest allegations
of harm."); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) ("Given that procedural right
and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is
entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.").
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litigation,1 1 enhance political attention to the issue, and increase the
likelihood of eventual Supreme Court involvement. 12 In the absence of
state involvement, litigation usually pits environmental groups
against industry groups, both of which have largely unsurprising and
static stances on environmental issues. Environmental groups
generally support more stringent environmental regulation, while
industry groups generally challenge environmental regulation. In
some cases, the involvement of states may be key to ensuring that an
environmental lawsuit passes the threshold standing question and
proceeds to the (sometimes very related) merits question.13 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Supreme Court emphasized
the "considerable relevance" to the standing decision that a sovereign
state, and not a private individual, was seeking review.1 4 Patrick A.
Parenteau, an environmental law professor at Vermont Law School,
put it this way: "If it had been the Sierra Club, I don't think you get
15
[Justice Kennedy's key] vote [in Massachusetts v. EPA]."
State involvement in a lawsuit indicates the state's willingness
to funnel resources into defending or challenging an issue, thereby

11. Some scholars have noted that states actually have few resources with which to initiate
lawsuits. See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698,
703 (2011) (discussing how "[s]tate enforcers are limited in number and must ration their own

scarce resources" when bringing enforcement actions against private parties"); Amy Widman,
Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State
Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008,
29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 165, 213 (2010) ("Attorneys general explain that these arrangements
with private counsel are necessary given limited public funding and resources."). If so, the state's
willingness to use its limited resources in order to join a lawsuit underscores the state's belief in
the importance of the suit, which should increase attention to the issue.
12. One of the purposes of the Supreme Court is to settle disputes among states. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend ...

to Controversies to which the United

").
States shall be a Party... [and] to Controversies between two or more States ....
13. I refer to Judge Randolph's majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA when the case
was decided in the D.C. Circuit. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(discussing the "factual overlap of the standing issues with EPA's justifications for not regulating
greenhouse gases" and deciding to proceed to the decision on the merits), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497; see
also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 514 ("In his opinion announcing the court's judgment,
Judge Randolph avoided a definitive ruling as to petitioners' standing, reasoning that it was
permissible to proceed to the merits because the standing and the merits inquiries
,overlap [pedl.'" (citations omitted)).
14. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518. See generally Mank, supra note 10, at 1727-29
(discussing the majority's decision on standing in Massachusetts v. EPA); Morriss, supra note 10
(criticizing the majority's potential expansion of standing).
15. Nelson, supranote 8.
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ensuring that its specific interest is adequately represented. 16 But
what is the state's interest? Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
characterized the litigating states as protecting their coastlines from
degradation and acting parens patriae, "parents of the nation," to
17
protect their citizens from the harm caused by climate change. If
states are litigating in response to the uneven distribution of the risks
of climate change and the costs of climate change mitigation
strategies, then their actions give prominence to these inequities and
18
can meaningfully contribute to an evaluation of agency decisions.
Just as amicus briefs by those with valuable outside knowledge or
perspectives provide information to a court, state involvement could
help a court determine the appropriateness of agency action in light of
federalism concerns.' 9 Similarly, media attention to these state issues
may prod Congress to alleviate the underlying equity concerns that
pervade climate change mitigation strategies. But if the states are
joining lawsuits blindly for political reasons, then these actions could
provide no useful information or could indicate that the debate has
prematurely moved out of the political sphere and into the
courtroom. 20 In addition, the justification for state involvement in
Massachusetts v. EPA-that states act as parenspatriae-canitself be
confusing. A parent state has many "sons" and "daughters" within its
boundaries, including members of environmental and industry groups.
Which voices do the states represent? And finally, what explains why
some states choose not to get involved in the litigation?

16. This is true both when a state intervenes in a lawsuit and when a state joins as a party
to a lawsuit. When intervening, a state has to show that it has a separate interest that needs
adequate representation. FED. R. APP. P. 15(d).
17. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520-21.
18. See Morriss, supra note 10 (calculating that states litigating in Massachusetts v. EPA in
support of federal greenhouse gas regulation typically would benefit from such regulation
relative to other states).
19. Solimine, supra note 10; see also Markell & Ruhl, supra note 10, at 75-76 (anticipating
"intergovernmental litigation to serve as the medium for resolving many of the federalism issues
pervading climate change policies").
20. This concern is similar to the rationale behind the political question doctrine, but it is
unlikely that the D.C. Circuit would rule that these cases present nonjusticiable political
questions. For one appellate court's analysis of the relevance of the political question doctrine,
see Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d. Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2527
(2011). I note, however, that state representatives submitted numerous failed proposed
legislation to curtail the EPA's regulation of greenhouse gases before many of those states
decided to become involved in the litigation. See Robin Bravender, State Legislators Ramp Up
Campaigns Against EPA Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/
2010/03/29/29greenwire-state-legislators-ramp-up-campaigns-against-ep- 73429.html?
pagewanted=all, for a discussion of some of the proposed legislation.
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Because state involvement could have significant consequences
on the litigation, the outcome of which, in turn, can affect the lives of
all citizens, it is important to understand the reasons behind state
involvement. Once scholars understand states' reasons, normative
questions-such as whether that kind of involvement is appropriate
and what, if any, jurisprudential weight the court should give the
involvement-become easier to analyze and answer.
This Note explores empirically the motivations behind state
involvement in the recent greenhouse gas litigation and finds that
states are using the courts to promote political goals. 21 States are
somewhat responsive to the costs of climate change mitigation, but
they are not responsive to various measures of climate change risks or
of public opinion within the state respecting climate change
mitigation. This result is dismaying, especially because some scholars
have found that individuals' climate change attitudes do tend to vary
22
with climate change risk perceptions.
Given states' political motivations, this Note also takes a stab
at the resulting normative considerations. It argues that state
differences are not adequately considered in the rulemaking process.
One solution would require agencies such as the EPA to prepare brief
state-specific regulatory impact analyses for major environmental
regulations. Such state-by-state analyses would lessen the need for
state involvement in lawsuits, where the state's influence might be
misplaced; would promote transparency, giving constituents valuable
information with which to hold their state representatives
accountable; and would ensure congressional awareness of issues with
disparate state impacts, allowing for timely consideration of other
policy options in an appropriate forum.
Part I provides background information on the current
greenhouse gas litigation in the D.C. Circuit, the theories of state
intervention in lawsuits, and the literature on climate change

21. Previously, scholars have descriptively analyzed state motivations behind state-level
climate change policymaking, Vivian E. Thomson & Vicki Arroyo, Upside-Down Cooperative
Federalism: Climate Change Policymaking and the States, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2011);
empirically considered the potential role of costs in litigation decisions, Morriss, supra note 10;
discussed the relevance of briefs submitted by state attorneys general, Solimine, supra note 10;
and empirically analyzed state involvement in multistate consumer protection litigation, Colin
Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection:Explaining State Attorney General Participationin
Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POL. RES. Q. 609, 609 (2006). This Note adds to this literature by
empirically analyzing many factors that may be relevant to the state involvement decision in the
greenhouse gas litigation and discussing implications of the findings.
22. Political leanings also correlate with climate change attitudes. See discussion infra Part
IV.A.2.

2012]

BLOWING HOT AIR

attitudes and climate geography. Part II briefly discusses the
empirical specification and the construction of the dataset used in this
Note's analysis. Part III presents the results of the empirical analysis,
concluding that states decide whether to intervene primarily based on
politics. Part IV discusses the implications of the results and proposes
a solution that would require the EPA to consider state-specific
differences in the costs and benefits of environmental regulations
during the rulemaking process. 23 Part IV also responds to criticisms of
this approach. Finally, the Note concludes by outlining the
implications for international climate change treaties as well as for
state involvement in other litigation.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Brief Overview of the Greenhouse Gas Litigation
The EPA has authority to prescribe emission standards for new
motor vehicles under Title II, section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. 24 The CAA
directs the EPA Administrator to prescribe motor vehicle standards
"applicable to the emission of any air pollutant . . . which in his
judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 25 Importantly,
the statute defines welfare effects to include "effects on . . .weather,
visibility, and climate." 26 The statute also defines an air pollutant
broadly to include any "substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air."27 Although the CAA categorizes
some pollutants as criteria pollutants with predetermined baseline
standards, it also requires the agency to consider new pollutants for
28
national standards.
Until recently, the EPA did not regulate greenhouse gas
emissions as air pollutants. During President George W. Bush's
Administration, the EPA's General Counsel Robert E. Fabricant
concluded that the EPA's legislative mandate did not extend to these
kinds of emissions largely because greenhouse gas emissions are a
global problem, and the regulation of the emissions through the CAA
23.

This would work similarly to Executive Order 12,866. See discussion infra Part IV.B.

24.

Clean Air Act § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).

25.

Id.

26. Id. § 7602(h).
27. Id. § 7602(g).
28. See id. §§ 7409-12 (outlining procedures for maintaining and updating a list of air
pollutants, control techniques and criteria, and air quality standards for each pollutant).
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would have significant political ramifications. 29 The EPA, relying on
these arguments, rejected a petition filed by several private
organizations urging the agency to regulate greenhouse gases. The
ensuing lawsuit made its way to the Supreme Court as Massachusetts
v. EPA.30
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court rejected all of the EPA's
arguments. 31 The Court determined that carbon dioxide 32 is clearly a
"substance ...which is emitted into.., the ambient air" and, hence,
33
the EPA has authority to regulate it.
Therefore, the Court concluded
that short of the EPA determining that carbon dioxide from motor
vehicles does not "cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," the
EPA must either regulate its emissions or give a reasonable
34
explanation for why it will not regulate them.
29. Memorandum from Robert E. Fabricant, EPA General Counsel, to Marianne L.
Horinko, Acting Administrator (Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Fabricant Memo], available at
http://www.icta.org/doc/FabricantMemoAug282003.pdf. Internally, the views of EPA's general
counsels seemingly varied with the presidential administration. Compare Fabricant Memo, id.,
with Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, EPA General Counsel, to Carol M. Browner,
Administrator
(Apr.
10,
1998),
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/
bpercival/casebook/documents/epaco2memol.pdf (concluding that carbon dioxide emissions are in
the scope of EPA's authority to regulate).
30. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
31 In Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA advanced several arguments. The agency argued
that greenhouse gas emissions are different from the other air pollutants it regulated because
they are not local air pollutants; their concentrations are somewhat consistent throughout the
world. Id. at 512. The EPA also argued that if Congress had wanted the EPA to regulate carbon
dioxide, it would have given the agency clear indication in the statute. Id. Furthermore, the EPA
argued that even if it had the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would refuse to regulate
them for a variety of reasons. For one, Congress already gave the Department of Transportation
the authority to regulate fuel economy standards. Since EPA regulation of tailpipe greenhouse
gas emissions would require setting fuel economy standards, its regulation would either be
superfluous or render the Department of Transportation's regulations meaningless. Id. at 513.
(Of course, the regulation rendered meaningless would be the less stringent one.) The EPA also
argued that the scientific information about carbon dioxide's effect on climate change was still
uncertain, making any regulation premature and potentially unwise. Id. Finally, the EPA
argued that controlling carbon dioxide emissions in such a piecemeal way would conflict with the
President's and Congress's comprehensive approaches to regulation. Id. at 513-14.
32. Because greenhouse gas emissions are typically calculated on a carbon dioxide
equivalent basis, the Court frequently refers only to carbon dioxide emissions.
33. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528 ("We have little trouble concluding that [EPA]
does [have authority to regulate greenhouse gases].").
34. Id. at 533 ("If EPA makes a finding of endangerment, the [CAA] requires the Agency to
regulate emissions of the deleterious pollutant from new motor vehicles."). Presumably, the
Court rejected the EPA's reasons for not regulating as unreasonable because the reasons were
not grounded in the statutory language. In light of the new regulations, lawmakers in Congress
have spent a lot of time discussing whether the Supreme Court's decision really gave the EPA
any viable option to issuing an endangerment finding. See, e.g., Lawrence Hurley & Elana Schor,
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In response to the Court's decision, the EPA initiated a study
on the contribution of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles to climate change. On December 15, 2009, the Administrator
of the EPA issued a finding that "the combined emissions of these
greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles . . . contribute to the
greenhouse gas air pollution that endangers public health and
welfare" of current and future generations. 35 These dangers ranged
from the adverse public health effects from increases in food- and
water-borne pathogens to the adverse public welfare effects from sealevel rise. 36 Given this Endangerment Finding, the EPA's legislative
mandate required the agency to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.
Hence, the EPA collaborated with the NHTSA to establish a coherent
37
approach to setting national fuel economy standards.
The imminent regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from
mobile sources, in turn, triggered the CAA's permitting programs for
stationary sources under the New Source Review Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V.38 This is because the permitting
programs cover pollutants that are "subject to regulation." 39 Since
December 18, 2008, the EPA has interpreted the phrase "subject to
regulation" to mean that the emissions of the pollutant are controlled
either by a provision in the CAA itself or by an EPA regulation
promulgated under the statute. 40 When the Tailpipe Rule for motor
vehicles (mobile sources) took effect on January 2, 2011, it officially
Congress Emits Half-Truths in Spin War Over Mass. v. EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwirel20l/03117/17greenwire-congress-emits-half-truths-in-spin-warover-im-12380.html?pagewanted=all (explaining the effect of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Massachusettsv. EPA on the debate concerning efforts to regulate greenhouse gases).
35. Endangerment Finding, supranote 3, at 66,496.
36. Id. at 66,497-98.
37. The agencies also ensured that the standards were consistent with the more stringent
average fuel economy standards already in place under California's regulatory program. The
EPA had previously granted California a waiver of CAA preemption, allowing the state to
establish its own greenhouse gas emission standards for motor vehicles beginning with the 2009
model year. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,744
(July 8, 2009) (notice).
38. See Triggering Interpretation, supra note 5, at 17,022 (explaining the policy and
application process surrounding permitting programs for stationary sources).
39. Id.
40. Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Administrator, to EPA Regional
Administrators, EPA's Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by
Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program (Dec. 18, 2008), available
at http://www.epa.gov/NSRldocuments/psd -interpretivememo_12.18.08.pdf. On March 29, 2010,
the EPA reconsidered and, eventually, reiterated that interpretation of the phrase. See
Triggering Interpretation, supra note 5, at 17,004 (indicating that the final action interpreting
the phrase "subject to regulation" was applicable as of March 29, 2010).
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made greenhouse gases "subject to regulation," thereby triggering the
permit requirements for major stationary sources of greenhouse gas
emissions on that date. 41 Under the statutory requirements, eligible
stationary sources would have to obtain permits to demonstrate that
they are using the best practices and technologies to minimize
greenhouse gas emissions.
In order to decrease administrative burdens on state
implementation agencies, the EPA adjusted the statutory threshold
level for carbon dioxide equivalent emissions that activate the permit
requirements. 42 Specifically, the statutory language would have
required permits for all stationary sources that emit more than 100 or
250 tons of greenhouse gases, which is a low bar for greenhouse gas
emissions. 43 The EPA expressed concern that regulating greenhouse
gases according to the statutory language would create "absurd
results" and argued that it could "apply statutory requirements
differently than a literal reading would indicate, as necessary to
effectuate congressional intent."44 Hence, the EPA promulgated a new
rule, the Tailoring Rule, which increased the permit threshold level
from 100 or 250 tons of carbon dioxide emissions per year to 75,000 or
45
100,000 tons per year, respectively.

41. Triggering Interpretation, supra note 5, at 17,004.
42. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 6, at 31,518 (explaining the adjustment in the statutory
threshold). The EPA calculates a source's greenhouse gas emissions by determining the sum of
the six greenhouse gases on a carbon dioxide equivalent basis.
43. Id. at 31,516-20. The applicable statutory threshold depends on whether or not the area
is in air quality attainment. The CAA defines a major source as one that emits more than 250
tons per year of the pollutant in an attainment area and as one that emits more than 100 tons
per year in a nonattainment area. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491(g), 7602(j) (2006). An attainment area is
"any area ...that meets the national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard for the
pollutant." Id. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(ii).
44. Tailoring Rule, supra note 6, at 31,516. This argument is a little strange given that
Congress admittedly did not intend for the CAA to cover greenhouse gas emissions when it
enacted the statute. See Markell & Ruhl, supra note 10, at 53-54, for a concise description of the
three legal doctrines on which the EPA supported its tailoring decision.
45. Tailoring Rule, supra note 6, at 31,514 ("EPA is relieving these resource burdens by
phasing in the applicability of these programs to GHG sources, starting with the largest GHG
emitters."). The requirement for obtaining a permit when in the 75,000 to 100,000 tons per year
range went into effect on July 1, 2011. See Gabriel Nelson, With Start of July, More Facilities
Need C02 Permits, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/01/
Olgreenwire-with-start-of-july-more-facilities-need-co2-pe-76189.html (explaining "Phase 2" of
the EPA's regulations concerning carbon dioxide permits). Some scholars have pointed out,
however, that requiring permits for major sources of greenhouse gas emissions is a limited step.
Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2011).
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This series of EPA rules and actions has generated significant
controversy. The D.C. Circuit is reviewing seventeen challenges to the
Endangerment Finding,46 more than forty challenges to the Triggering
Interpretation and the Tailoring Rule, 47 and seventeen challenges to
the Tailpipe Rule regulating the emission of greenhouse gases from
48
motor vehicles.
Among the challengers and supporters of the EPA's actions are
thirty-seven states. 49 By March 2010, eighteen states requested to
intervene on behalf of the EPA ("pro-EPA") on at least one of the
rules, 50 and nineteen states requested to intervene in opposition to the
EPA ("con-EPA") on at least one of the rules.5 1 Table 1 summarizes the
46. These challenges have been consolidated as Coalitionfor Responsible Regulation, Inc. v.
EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2010) (order for consolidation of cases). The Court has
already received the con-EPA states' brief. Brief of Texas for State Petitioners and Supporting
Intervenors, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. May 20, 2011)
[hereinafter Brief of State Petitioners (Endangerment Finding)].
47. Eighteen challenges to the Triggering Interpretation, supranote 5, were consolidated as
Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2010) (order for
consolidation of cases); twenty-six challenges to the Tailoring Rule, supra note 6, were
consolidated as Southeastern Legal Foundation,Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1131 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 2010)
(order for consolidation of cases). The Court has already received the con-EPA states' brief. Brief
of State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA,
No. 10-073 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2011) [hereinafter Brief of State Petitioners (Triggering
Interpretation and Tailoring Rule)].
48. These challenges have been consolidated as Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v.
EPA, No. 10-1092 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (order for consolidation of cases). The Court has
already received the con-EPA states' brief. Brief of State Petitioners and Supporting Intervenor,
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1092 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 2011) [hereinafter
Brief of State Petitioners (Tailpipe Rule)]. Notably, the National Association of Manufacturers,
though challenging EPA's stationary-source regulations, is not challenging the Tailpipe Rule
because the main automobile manufacturers have already given EPA their support for the rule.
See Gabriel Nelson, 3 Filings Offer Previews of Legal Attack on EPA Regs, GREENWIRE, Sept. 16,
2010, available at http://www.eenews.net/gw/2010/09/16 (discussing the challengers' arguments
against the EPA's finalized greenhouse gas regulations).
49. Bravender, supranote 8.
50. Motion for Leave to Intervene as Respondents, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v.
EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2010) (filed by Pennsylvania and Minnesota); Motion for
Leave to Intervene as Respondents, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter Petition of Massachusetts et al.] (filed by Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, and the
City of New York). I do not include New York City in my analysis, and Arizona has since dropped
out of the litigation. I could not locate North Carolina's Motion for Leave to Intervene (pro-EPA,
Tailoring Rule only), but its involvement is clear in the con-EPA states' brief for the Tailoring
Rule. See Brief of State Petitioners (Triggering Interpretation and Tailoring Rule), supra note 47.
51. See Petition for Review, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1039 (D.C.
Cir. Feb. 16, 2010) (filed by Alabama); Petition for Review, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc.
v. EPA, No. 10-1041 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2010) (filed by Texas); Petition for Review of the
Commonwealth of Virginia ex rel. Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Coal. for Responsible Regulation,
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states' positions. According to a petition that several pro-EPA states
joined, the states requested to intervene because, among other
reasons, "a negative outcome in terms of the validity of the Final Rule
will delay or prevent the EPA from taking steps to reduce the direct
risk to Massachusetts (and others)." 52 The con-EPA states, on the
other hand, focused on the "harm [to their] citizens, businesses that
operate within their borders, and their overall economies" in a petition
53
several of them had joined.
Most of the state challenges focus on the permit requirements
for stationary sources and not the requirements for mobile sources.
Those states that challenge the mobile-source Tailpipe Rule generally
allege that it triggered the stationary-source permit requirements
without appropriate analysis. 54 For example, Texas, a state that is
suing the EPA directly, unsuccessfully moved for the D.C. Circuit to
prevent the Tailpipe Rule from taking effect, arguing in part that "the
agency did not consider the impact of the permit rule when it assessed
the costs and benefits of the . . . tailpipe rule."55 Despite the EPA's
opposition, the D.C. Circuit granted a motion by the petitioners to

Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1036, (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2010) (filed by Virginia); Motion for Leave to
Intervene by the State of Alaska, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 13, 2010) (filed by Alaska); Motion for Leave to Intervene of the State of
Michigan, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2010)
(filed by Michigan); Motion for Leave to Intervene by the States of Nebraska, Florida, Hawaii,
Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Governor Haley Barbour for the State of Mississippi, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, & Utah in Support of Petitioners the
Commonwealth of Virginia & the States of Alabama & Texas, Coal. for Responsible Regulation,
Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Petition of Nebraska et al.] (filed
by Nebraska, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah). I could not locate Georgia's Motion for
Leave to Intervene (con-EPA, Tailpipe Rule only), but its involvement is clear in the states' brief
for the Tailpipe Rule. See Brief of State Petitioners (Tailpipe Rule), supra note 48.
52. Petition of Massachusetts et al., supra note 50, at 6.
53. Petition of Nebraska et al., supra note 51, at 7.
54. See, e.g., Texas's Motion for Stay of EPA's Endangerment Finding, Timing Rule, and
Tailpipe Rule, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1092 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15,
2010) [hereinafter Texas's Motion for Stay] ("Not only does the Tailpipe Rule rest upon a legally
flawed Endangerment Finding-and without a proper endangerment finding there is no legal
basis for the regulation of motor vehicles under CAA § 202(a)-but it also suffers from ... other,
EPA should have considered the impact on stationary sources in
independent legal defects ....
the Tailpipe Rule because it had already concluded that GHG regulation of light-duty vehicle
emissions would automatically trigger stationary-source regulation of GHG emissions."); see also
Brief of State Petitioners (Tailpipe Rule), supra note 48, at 3-4 (alleging that the Tailpipe Rule
triggered stationary-source permit requirements without sufficient analysis).
55. Texas's Motion for Stay, supra note 54, at 20. The court denied this motion on December
10, 2010. Court Order, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
10, 2010) [hereinafter Court Order].
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coordinate the challenges to the mobile-source rules (Endangerment
Finding and Tailpipe Rule) with challenges to the stationary-source
rules (Triggering Interpretation and Tailoring Rule5 6), meaning that
the same three-judge panel-Chief Judge Sentelle, Judge Rogers, and
Judge Tatel-will hear the cases at the same time. 57 Because the
Tailpipe Rule took effect on January 2, 2011, the D.C. Circuit will
decide the coordinated cases on their merits against the backdrop of
58
the Tailpipe and Tailoring Rules' implementation.

56. Again, these two challenges have been consolidated into one case, Coalition for
Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 2, 2010) (consolidating cases).
57. See Court Order, supra note 55 (granting motion by petitioners to coordinate action in
cases). Compare Petitioner's Motion for Coordination of Related Cases, Coal. for Responsible
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1131 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 26, 2010) ("[The Court should designate the
aforementioned collections of pending cases 'complex'; coordinate (but not consolidate) briefing
across these complex cases; and assign the management and resolution of the cases to a single,
three-judge panel for all purposes."), with Respondent's Opposition to Motion for Coordination of
Cases and Cross-Motion for Consolidation of Consolidated Case No. 10-1131 with Consolidated
Case No. 10-1073, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 10-1215 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10,
2010) ("EPA opposes Movant Petitioners' request to coordinate the Stationary Source cases with
the cases challenging the Mobile Source Rules."). The EPA did not want to increase the chances
that the Court may decide to overturn the EPA regulations as a block. See Lawrence Hurley,
Court Order on Greenhouse Gas Rules Provides Comfort to Industry Challengers, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec.
14,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/12/14/14greenwire-court-order-ongreenhouse-gas-rules-provides-co-4226.html
(explaining the EPA's concerns following the
decision to coordinate the actions in these cases). The court revealed the three-judge panel in
November 2011. See Lawrence Hurley, Court Sets Aside 2 Days for Greenhouse Gas Rules
Arguments, Reveals Panel, ENV'T & ENERGY NEWS PM, Nov. 2, 2011, available at
http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm2011/11/02/2.
58. On December 10, 2010, the D.C. Circuit denied the motions to stay the greenhouse gas
emissions rules from taking effect on January 2, 2011. Court Order, supra note 55, at 3. Hence,
there are now lawsuits stemming from the EPA's requirement for state implementation plans to
accommodate the new greenhouse gas permit rules ("SIP Call"). See, e.g., Wyoming v. EPA, No.
11-9504 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 2011) (transferred from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit); Texas v. EPA, No. 10-1425 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 25, 2011). See generally Gabriel Nelson, Wyo.
Joins Texas in Suing EPA Over Regulatory Rollout, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/02/16/16greenwire-wyo-joins-texas-in-suing-epa-over-rolloutof-g-86597.html (explaining Wyoming's view that the EPA set unreasonable deadlines for the
state to meet, thereby prompting Wyoming to commence litigation proceedings). Notably,
Wyoming has remained neutral in the greenhouse gas litigation that I analyze.
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF THE STATES' POSITIONS IN
THE GREENHOUSE GAS LITIGATION.

States Intervening in
Support of the EPA
(Pro-EPA)
(19 states)
Arizona
California
Connecticut
Delaware
Illinois
Iowa
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
New Hampshire
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Vermont
Washington

States Intervening to
Challenge the EPA
(Con-EPA)
(18 states)
Alabamat
Alaska
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Nebraska
North Dakota
Oklahoma
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texast
Utah
Virginiat

States Abstaining
from the Litigation
(Neutral)
(13 states)
Arkansas
Colorado
Idaho
Kansas
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
Nevada
Ohio
Tennessee
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

SOURCE. Court documents, as cited in notes 50-51. A t indicates that the state is suing
the EPA directly. Arizona, Hawaii, and Pennsylvania have since dropped out of the court battle,
but I include them in my analysis because I am analyzing the initial decision to enter the legal
59
dispute in early 2010.

59. See Gabriel Nelson, Ariz. Pulls Support for EPA 'sEndangerment Finding,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2011, http:/Iwww.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/28/28greenwire-ariz-pulls-support-forepas-greenhouse-gas-end-23584.html; Don Hopey, Pa. Pulls Out of 5 Pollution Suits,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE.COM, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/l1245/1171571454-0.stm (discussing Hawaii's exit as well). I could not independently confirm Hawaii's exit. In
Arizona, the new attorney general is a Republican, and in Pennsylvania, the new governor is a
Republican, replacing Democrats that held those offices previously. To the extent that the
conditions in which I am interested seem to have changed in these states, the states present an
interesting case study. See Nelson, supra ('The reversal by Arizona follows a trend in which
positions on the climate litigation have lined up with states' partisan leanings.").
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B. Theories of State Involvement in EnvironmentalLitigation
Courts and political scientists have suggested several reasons
for state involvement in litigation. Generally speaking, a state may
initiate or join litigation (1) to protect its interests (which, in the case
of environmental litigation, are environmental interests); (2) to protect
the general welfare of its citizens; or (3) to reap political benefits from
involvement through voter or political party approval. Pursuant to
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 15(d), the intervening states
must claim an interest that could be impaired by the resolution of the
60
lawsuit and that is not already represented by other parties.
Meanwhile, the states directly suing the EPA must satisfy standing
requirements, which are considered to be more stringent requirements
than those for intervention. 6 1 In this Part, I briefly analyze how the
possible motivations behind state involvement have been judicially
scrutinized. Thereby, this discussion provides one lens through which
to assess the normative implications of a state's particular
62
motivation.
1. State Environmental Interests
Typically, a state or local government will sue the federal
government if the federal government passes a law that preempts
60. Specifically, when considering a motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 15(d), courts often refer to the criteria of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) for
intervention as of right. Sierra Club, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2004). These
criteria are that: (1) the application for intervention must be timely; (2) the applicant must claim
an interest relating to the subject of the action; (3) disposition of the action may, as a practical
matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest; and (4) existing parties
may not adequately represent the applicant's interest. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). In order to satisfy
these criteria, the states have put forth various unique interests, some relating to the states'
general interests in the welfare of their citizens and some relating to concern for their borders.
See Brief of State Petitioners (Triggering Interpretation and Tailoring Rule), supra note 47; Brief
of State Petitioners (Tailpipe Rule), supra note 48.
61. Generally, a plaintiff satisfies the standing requirement if he can show that he has
suffered an "injury in fact," that there is a causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and
the defendant's conduct, and that a decision by the court will redress his injury. See generally
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 784-844 (Robert
C. Clark et al. eds., 2010) (discussing standing to obtain judicial review).
62. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has listed three capacities
under which states may sue in federal court: "(1) proprietary suits in which the State sues much
like a private party suffering a direct, tangible injury; (2) sovereignty suits requesting
adjudication of boundary disputes or water rights; or (3) parens patriae suits in which States
litigate to protect 'quasi-sovereign' interests." Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.
2000) (citations omitted). These enumerated motivations are similar to the ones this Note
explores in this Section.
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local law. 63 Then, if a state litigates, its interest is clear: the state
enters the lawsuit to preserve its interests in its own state law. In the
context of greenhouse gas emissions, where many states already
participate in a market-based mitigation program on a regional level,
the issue of preemption may arise, for example, if the federal
government decides to regulate greenhouse gases using a national
64
market-based mitigation program.
In addition to preserving its legal interests, a state may
intervene in a lawsuit to protect other tangible interests potentially
affected by the resolution of the suit. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the
Court's analysis of Massachusetts' standing65 left the impression that
states entered the lawsuit because of a concern for their borders and
property. 66 Specifically, the Court reasoned that Massachusetts
satisfied the injury component of standing because it "alleged a
particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner"-the injury being
the Commonwealth-owned coastal lands already affected by rising sea

63. See, e.g., City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 66 (1988) ("[The Commission acted
within the statutory authority conferred by Congress when it pre-empted state and local
technical standards governing the quality of cable television signals.").
64. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.orghome (last visited
Sept. 19, 2011) ('The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the first market-based
regulatory program in the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions."); WESTERN
CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2011) ('The
[Western Climate Initiative] is a collaboration of independent jurisdictions working together to..
. tackle climate change at a regional level."). In the D.C. Circuit cases, however, the national
preemption of state greenhouse gas regulation is not an issue. Although I exclude this possible
interest from my analysis explicitly, the factors that may have led to intervention in the
litigation may have been similar to the factors that led to the participation (or nonparticipation)
in a regional program. See Thomson & Arroyo, supra note 21, at 3-4 (categorizing states into
groups based on whether they are involved in state-level climate change policy and descriptively
discussing the economic and political factors that likely played a role in those decisions). Federal
government preemption was an issue in other climate change litigation, however, such as when
the EPA rejected California's petition to regulate tailpipe carbon dioxide emissions. See
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008)
(notice) (denying California's petition for a waiver of CAA preemption). The Supreme Court has
already found that the EPA's greenhouse gas regulations displace any state right to require
power plants to lower carbon dioxide emissions. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2537 (2011). For a discussion of preemption in the context of climate change, see William
W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate Change Legislation, and the
Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 35-52 (2009).
65. The Court focused its analysis on Massachusetts because only one of the petitioners
needs to have standing in order to allow review. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518
(2007) (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2
(2006)).
66. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens referred to a state's independent interest "in
all the earth and air within its domain." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519 (quoting Georgia
v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
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levels. 67 The Court also emphasized the potential for future injury to
coastal property, which could result in remediation costs running "well
into the hundreds of millions of dollars." 68 Because these interests
satisfied the standing inquiry, presumably these interests are
important enough for a state to also protect via intervention.
Tangible climate change risks, such as the border erosion that
the Supreme Court legitimized as a relevant interest, should be even
more salient for the states since the release of the EPA's December
2009 Endangerment Finding. 69 In the Endangerment Finding, the
EPA named several risks of harm that could result from climate
change. Specifically, the EPA found that increased greenhouse gas
emissions and the associated climate change can affect public health
through "changes in air quality, increases in temperatures, changes in
extreme weather events, increases in food- and water-borne
pathogens, and changes in aeroallergens." 70 The agency also found
likely effects on public welfare through "risks to food production and
agriculture, forestry, water resources, sea level rise and coastal areas,
energy, infrastructure, and settlements, and ecosystems and
wildlife." 71 These risks would all have significant effects on the state's
environmental interests as a landowner.
2. General Welfare of State Citizens
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court also suggested that a state
could have standing to sue parens patriaeif the alleged injury to the
health and welfare of its citizens is "one that the State, if it could,
would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking
powers." 72 The Court argued that such standing gives the state
"special solicitude" to protect its "quasi-sovereign interests" in the
67. Id. at 522.
68. Id. at 522-23 ('The severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the next
century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one Massachusetts official believes that a
significant fraction of coastal property will be 'either permanently lost through inundation or
temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.' Remediation costs alone,
petitioners allege, could run well into the hundreds of millions of dollars.") (citations omitted).
69. Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,496. Some scholars have found that
perceived risks are the ones that matter. See Sammy Zahran et al., Climate Change Vulnerability
and Policy Support, 19 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 771 (2006) ("Numerous studies also show that
perceived risk is a strong indic[a]tor of citizen willingness to pay the costs of climate change
adaptation and mitigation.").
70. Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,497.
71. Id. at 66,498.
72. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 519 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)).
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maintenance of its citizens' welfare against abuse from the federal
73
government.
With respect to the pro-EPA states, their showing under the
parens patriae doctrine would track their showing under the previous
theory that alleged state environmental interests. This is because the
same interests that affect the state as a landowner would also affect
the state's citizens. Several scholars have recently noted how states
have invoked the parenspatriae doctrine for authority to sue on behalf
of their citizens in environmental litigation.7 4 One example is
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., where the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") found that the states
had alleged quasi-sovereign interests that satisfy standing
requirements:
[The States] are more than "nominal parties." Their interest in safeguarding the public
health and their resources is an interest apart from any interest held by individual
private entities. Their quasi-sovereign interests involving their concern for the "health
and well-being-both physical and economic--of [their] residents in general" are classic
examples of a state's quasi-sovereign interest. The States have alleged that the injuries
resulting from carbon dioxide emissions will affect virtually their entire populations.
Moreover, it is7 doubtful that individual plaintiffs filing a private suit could achieve
complete relief. 5

73. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts sharply
criticized the majority for making up special standing requirements for states. See id. at 536-37
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("Relaxing Article III standing requirements because asserted injuries
are pressed by a State, however, has no basis in our jurisprudence ....").He accused the
majority of misunderstanding Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907), which he believed upheld a
state's right "to sue in a representative capacity as parens patriae,"a right that is distinct from
the requirements of standing. Id. at 538. He also rejected the suggestion that a state could show
standing by suing on behalf of private parties in a situation where the private parties could not
satisfy standing. Id. Justice Stevens defends his reliance on Tennessee Copper in a footnote,
explaining how the decision "devotes an entire Part to chronicling the long development of cases
permitting States 'to litigate as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign interests.' " Id. at 520
n.17 (majority opinion) (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WESCHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 290 (5th ed. 2003)). In a previous case, the Supreme
Court seemed to explain that the state's promotion of quasi-sovereign interests as parenspatriae
would still need to satisfy standing requirements by being "sufficiently concrete to create an
actual controversy between the State and the defendant." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S.
at 601-02. For the purposes of this discussion, this Note does not evaluate whether parens
patriaerequirements are, or should be, separate from standing requirements.
74. See, e.g., Myrian Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake
of ATT v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (pointing out the difficulty of
maintaining environmental parenspatriaelitigation under stringent class-action jurisprudence);
Gillian E. Metzger, Federalismand FederalAgency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 63-64 (2011)
(discussing the parenspatriaeholding in Massachusetts v. EPA).
75. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d. Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S.Ct.
2527 (2011) (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's grant of
standing by an equally divided court 76-with four members holding
that the states had satisfied standing and four holding that the states
had not satisfied standing-and proceeded to discuss the case on its
merits. 77 Hence, it is likely that these interests are sufficient to allow
a pro-EPA state to sue in federal court, but it is still a disputed
78
question.
The con-EPA states may have a more difficult time justifying
their presence in the litigation. In certain contexts, the Court has held
that a state asserting an interest in the protection of the "health and
welfare" of citizens cannot simply assert injury to its general
economy. 79 This suggests that concern over industry costs, like concern
over injury to the economy in general, might not pass muster if the
state is hoping to satisfy standing by suing parens patriae for the
general welfare of citizens. Whether such an interest alone should also
qualify as an interest that "existing parties may not adequately
represent" under the intervention inquiry is another question,
especially given the involvement of well-organized parties, such as
business or environmental groups.
3. Public Opinion and Politics
A third potential motivation for state intervention is based on
the mechanics of entering a lawsuit. Generally, the state attorney
general consults with the state governor to initiate a lawsuit or a
motion to intervene.8 0 Because these political actors are usually

76. Justice Sotomayor did not participate. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2540 (2011).
77. Id. at 2535.
78. Justice Sotomayor was on the panel to hear Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. before

she was elevated to the Supreme Court. Judges McLaughlin and Hall, who were in agreement,
decided the case. Nonetheless, commentators expect that she would have sided with the
affirming justices. See Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Takes Up Climate 'Nuisance'Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.nytimes.comlgwire/2010/12/06/O6greenwire-supreme.courttakes-up-climate-nuisance-case-71478.html ("Neither Sotomayor or Justice Elena Kagan was on
the court then, but most experts would expect them to vote with the liberals.").
79. Milton Handler & Michael Blechmann, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The
Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626, 630-31 (1976); see
also Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972). This rejected interest under the
Clayton Act sounds strikingly similar to the interest that the con-EPA states allege in their
petitions to intervene. See Petition of Nebraska et al., supra note 51, at 6-7. But, again, the
standing requirement may be more difficult to satisfy than the requirement to intervene.
80. Solimine, supranote 10 (manuscript at 22).
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elected,81 they have an incentive to respond to the preferences of their
constituents and their political party; they generally need the support
of both to achieve reelection. Below is a brief overview of the
on potential
implications of this broad political science 8theory
2
lawsuits.
in
intervention
state
motivations behind
Public choice theorists have modeled rational politicians as
responsive to the preferences of the median voter.8 3 Some political
scientists argue that this general incentive to be responsive to the
majority's will may vary in strength, depending on how salient the
issue is and how likely the politician is to know his constituents'
preferences.8 4 Because climate change is a prominent and
controversial issue, constituents may be more likely to care and hold a
strong opinion about how to confront it. According to this theory, even
if an attorney general believes that the probability of climate change is
zero, he would still support regulation that would mitigate the impact
of climate change if the median voter supports such action. This
theory suggests that the attorney general's climate change beliefs
should not be a strong predictor of the decision to litigate and of the
81. The attorney general is elected in forty-three states, appointed by the governor in five
states (Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming), appointed by the
legislature in one state (Maine), and appointed by the supreme court in one state (Tennessee).
Lemos, supra note 11, at 701 n.8 (citing William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?
Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446,
2448 n.3 (2006)).
82. In this Section, I leave open the possibility that some attorney general-initiated
intervention may be appropriate. I note, however, that some scholars have argued that a lawsuit
initiated by a state attorney general on behalf of the state's citizens could be inappropriate. See
Solimine, supra note 10 (manuscript at 6); see also Timothy Meyer, Federalism and
Accountability: State Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95
CALIF. L. REV. 885, 886 (2007) (discussing how state attorneys general have used litigation to
inappropriately "become a regulatory force at the national level'); Gilles & Friedman, supra note
74 (manuscript at 5) (predicting that state attorneys general will make broader use of their
parens patriae authority to represent the interests of their citizens in cases that used to be
brought as class actions, given the Court's decisions in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011), and especially in AT&TMobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
83. See, e.g., Jason Bell et al., Voter-Weighted Environmental Preferences, 28 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 655, 656 (2009) ("Overall societal preferences are pertinent for social welfare
calculations, but it is the preferences of people who vote that influence the representatives who
are elected and the policies they support."); Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group DecisionMaking, 56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 28 (1948) (calculating that preference for the "median optimum"
results in at least a simple majority vote); Sam Peltzman, Constituent Interest and Congressional
Voting, 27 J.L. & ECON. 181, 210 (1984) (concluding that constituents' interests may better
explain a politician's position on certain issues than ideology).
84. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Explaining Democratic Performance in the
States 7 (June 29, 2009) (unpublished meeting paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1450964, for a general discussion of how salience and other factors
may affect a politician's incentive to be responsive.
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position taken in the litigation. This theory instead suggests that if
the median voter's preferences are (rationally) influenced by risk
levels and increased costs, then the attorney general's decision to
litigate would also be influenced by risk levels and costs. 85 The public
choice theory lends support to the relevance of public opinion
measures and climate change risk variables in the attorney general's
decision to support or challenge the EPA's regulations.
In order to have a successful run for reelection, the state
attorney general may also be sensitive to the preferences of his
political party.86 Affiliation with a major political party provides the
politician with access to the party's fundraising and campaign
resources, and when the preferences of the median voter are unknown,
the stance of the political party may be especially influential. Many
political scientists have found that individuals often hold inconsistent
or poorly defined opinions on many issues, regardless of the salience of
the issues.8 7 These kinds of voters may use the politician's political
affiliation as a shortcut for ascertaining whether the politician holds
similar views-and when the politician runs afoul of the party, the
voters may be more likely to know about it through the mouthpiece of
the party. Either way, this aspect of the theory suggests that the
attorney general's political affiliation may be an important driver
behind the state's decision to support or to challenge the EPA's
regulations.88

85. As in, I think that the costs and benefits of mitigation policy could be relevant. Some
scholars worry, however, that increased attention to these costs and benefits could entrench and
mobilize beneficiaries of climate change itself. See J.B. Ruhl, What Should We Do About the
Climate Change Winners? 12-13 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working
Paper No. 11-30, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1953928 (summarizing the
argument that policymakers should "focus principally on cost-effective measures to stabilize
climate without regard to the impact . . . on the sub-national distribution of climate change
benefits"). See discussion infra Part IV.B.
86. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 11, at 722 (citing Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT:
ANTITRUST JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252, 257-60 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael
S. Greve eds., 2004) for the argument that state attorneys general are focused primarily on
promoting their political careers, but responding that "the critique is almost certainly
overstated").
87. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, Nonattitudes and American Public Opinion: Comment: The
Status of Nonattitudes, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 650, 650-51 (1974) (finding that a percentage of
respondents haphazardly answered questions on a variety of issues).
88. Potential support for this theory could come from the examples of Arizona and
Pennsylvania. Both states are in my dataset as states that entered the litigation in support of
the EPA. After a change in the attorney general (and his affiliation) in Arizona and a change in
the governor (and his affiliation) in Pennsylvania, both states dropped out of the litigation. See
discussion supranote 59.
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Finally, attorneys general, like other politicians, may be
influenced by interest groups such as big industry that provide
substantial support to the politicians or the political party.8 9 This
theory suggests that industry preferences would be strongly
associated with the state's decision to enter litigation, and, if so, its
decision on what side to support. Industry preferences are unlikely to
align with the EPA's actions because carbon dioxide regulations
threaten an increase in industry costs. Under such regulations,
industries would have to comply with permitting requirements and
install specific technologies to minimize their greenhouse gas
emissions. Hence, according to this theory, states with stronger
industry interests would have a higher probability of entering the
litigation to challenge the EPA.
C. Previous Work on Climate Attitudes and Geography
Much of the analysis section of this Note builds on the work of
two groups of researchers that have analyzed the connections between
climate change vulnerability, the cost of controlling carbon dioxide
emissions, and policy support. The first group, led by sociologist
Sammy Zahran, found that the extent to which citizens feel personally
threatened by climate change drives support for climate change
mitigation policies. 90 Meanwhile, economists Michael I. Cragg and
Matthew E. Kahn found that legislative representatives from
conservative, poor areas with higher per-capita carbon emissions have
much lower probabilities of voting in favor of climate change
mitigation policies, which are likely to impose high costs on carbon
emitters. 91 I describe this previous research below.
Zahran et al. investigated the motivations underlying the
92
attitudes of individuals toward climate change mitigation policies.
Previous studies analyzed correlations between an individual's
willingness to support climate change mitigation policies with his or

89. For example, numerous economists and political scientists have studied the relationship
between campaign contributions and representative voting behavior. See generally Stephen
Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr., Why is There so Little Money in
U.S. Politics, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003) (surveying some of this literature).
90. Zahran et al., supra note 69, at 772.
91. Michael I. Cragg & Matthew E. Kahn, Carbon Geography: The Political Economy of
CongressionalSupport for Legislation Intended to Mitigate Greenhouse Gas Production 13 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14,963, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org
/papers/w14963.
92. Zahran et al., supra note 69, at 772.
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her socioeconomic characteristics.9 3 Those studies have generally
found that income and education are positively associated with
climate change beliefs.9 4 In their analysis, Zahran et al. also included
data measuring the degree to which individuals are physically at risk
from possible negative effects of climate change. 95 Specifically, they
included variables capturing the individual's perceived and objective
climate change risks and the individual's state's total carbon dioxide
emissions.9 6 The authors found that the higher an individual perceives
the risk of climate change, the more likely he or she is to support
climate change mitigation policies.9 7 Similarly, individuals that live in
areas with more salient climate change risks-areas undergoing
temperature changes or facing extreme weather events-are also
significantly more likely to support costly climate change mitigation
efforts.98
The authors found that those living within a mile of a coastline,
however, are actually less likely to support climate change mitigation
policies-contra to the authors' predictions. 9 And, not surprisingly,
individuals living in states with high carbon dioxide emissions are less
likely to support costly climate change mitigation policies. 10 0 This
research demonstrated the importance of local geography and also
suggested that the political and socioeconomic characteristics of the
region at large are influential on a person's attitudes.
Economists Cragg and Kahn, in contrast, analyzed the
motivations underlying the voting behavior of policymakers on carbon

93. Id.
94.

See, e.g., ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING'S SIX AMERICAS IN MAY 2011,

at 52 (2011), available at http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/SixAmericasMay2Oll.pdf
(finding the greater the household income the more likely a participant was to be concerned
about the effects of climate change); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibilityfor
the Failure of Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1657, 1675 (2007) (empirically
evaluating individual beliefs about climate change and policy preferences in Europe).
95. Zahran et al., supra note 69, at 772.
96. For example, the authors included variables that indicated whether an individual is
within a mile of a coastline, whether an individual lives in an area undergoing statistically
significant changes in temperature, and whether an individual lives in an area with higher
frequencies of natural disasters and extreme weather events. Id. at 780.
97. Id. at 781.
98. Id. at 782.
99. Id. at 783 ("This finding does not bode well for policy advocates of climate change
mitigation because individuals at greatest risk of inundation are among the least willing to
absorb the costs of reform."). Similarly, this Note finds that states with a seacoast are less likely
to support greenhouse gas regulation. See discussion infra Part III.
100. Id.
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dioxide regulation. 10 1 They found that the anticipated costs of climate
change mitigation policies, which seem to disproportionally affect
conservative and poor areas of the United States, are statistically
patterns. 102
voting
congressional
to
related
significantly
Representatives from carbon dioxide-intensive areas are less likely to
vote for climate change mitigation legislation. 10 3 The authors predict
that the "existing carbon geography, voting preferences, and the
distribution of income" will result in political deadlock, unless
policymakers design a legislation in which "winners compensate
10 4
losers," for example.
This Note explores similar motivations behind states'
"attitudes" on climate change. Our system of government is far from a
direct democracy, and the connection between state policy choices and
citizens' preferences can be tenuous. One of the goals of this Note is to
empirically separate a few of the theoretically supported, but
potentially conflicting, motivations for state intervention, as
previously described, and to determine which of them are actually
associated with the states' positions in the ongoing greenhouse gas
litigation.

II. DATASET AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
A. Constructingthe Dataset
To analyze state motivations, I compiled data from multiple
sources, including reports, surveys, and government datasets, to
generate relevant variables. My outcome (or dependent) variables are
whether the state decided to intervene in the greenhouse gas litigation
and, if so, whether it intervened in support of or in opposition to the
EPA. This Section describes the independent variables that I use in
the main analysis. I also created a series of other variables to use in
sensitivity analyses to ensure that the main qualitative results are
robust. In order to make this Section clear and accessible, I describe
only the main variables in the text and leave the descriptions of other

101.
102.
103.
104.

Cragg & Kahn, supra note 91, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 18-19.

2012]

BLOWING HOT AIR

213

variables-and their effects on my conclusions-for the footnotes and
the Appendix. 105
1. Climate Change Risk Measures
I account for the different state climate change risks with three
variables in the main analysis: (1) an indicator for whether the state
has a seacoast; (2) a variable representing the contribution of the "crop
and animal production" (farming) industry to state gross domestic
product ("GDP"); and (3) a variable that indicates the average latitude
for each state. 10 6 The first variable is equal to 1 if the state has a
seacoast and equal to 0 if otherwise. 10 7 The risks of climate change on
coastal areas are well documented,1 0 8 and "[o]bserved sea level rise is
already increasing the risk of storm surge and flooding in some coastal
areas."10 9 Therefore, of all risks, I predict the risks to seacoast
property from climate change to be most salient to state policymakers.
I also create a variable that denotes the contribution of the farming
industry to state GDP, using 2008 data from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. 110 While acknowledging that the data on risks to the
agricultural sector is more probabilistic, the EPA concluded that "[t]he
body of evidence points towards [an] increasing risk of net adverse
impacts on U.S. food production and agriculture over time, with the
potential for significant disruptions and crop failure in the future."'
While the other two variables pick up objective risks, the third
variable-average state latitude-may pick up perceived risks of
climate change. Some studies have shown that residents of colder and

105. See Lee Epstein et al., On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical
Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1851 (2006) (encouraging researchers to eliminate
irrelevant or distracting numbers from their displays).
106. In robustness checks, I create other variables that capture the risk of climate change.
Inclusion of these other variables does not change my qualitative conclusions. See the Appendix.
107. In all specifications, I include regional dummies for the South, West, Northeast, and
Midwest to ensure that the seacoast variable is not driven by the southern states. The
coefficients for the regional variables are generally insignificant and do not otherwise affect my
qualitative conclusions.
108. Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,498 ('The evidence concerning adverse
impacts in the areas of water resources and sea level rise and coastal areas provides the clearest
and strongest support for an endangerment finding, both for current and future generations.").
109. Id.
110. Gross Domestic Product By State, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, http://www.bea.gov/regionallgsp/ (last updated Sept. 29, 2011).
111. Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,498. In robustness checks, I use another
measure of agricultural risks that takes into account variable impacts in different states. See the
Appendix.
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wetter areas do not perceive the risks of climate change to be as bad
as do residents of warmer and drier areas. 112 The average latitude
could proxy for these perceived differences because temperatures tend
to decrease as latitude increases. 113 According to summary statistics,
reported in Table 2, the states supporting the EPA are more likely to
have a seacoast, are farther north, and derive less of their state GDP
from farming as compared to both states challenging the EPA and
states abstaining from the litigation.
2. Carbon Dioxide Emissions
A state's carbon dioxide emissions represent the direct costs of
the permit regulation, because the more carbon dioxide-emitting
major sources a state has, the more permits the state must issue. 114 In
addition, the states will eventually have to determine best-available
control technologies for greenhouse gas emissions for new sources and
modified emissions units under the Title V program.1 1 5 Once the states
implement the carbon dioxide permitting plans and determine bestavailable control technologies, carbon-emitting industries will also
face compliance costs. 1 1 6 Hence, carbon dioxide emissions represent
the perceived present and future costs of the EPA stationary-source
regulation for the states and industries within the states. To capture
these perceived costs, I use the 2007 emission rate by state in the
main analysis." 7 According to Table 2, states supporting the EPA

112. See, e.g., Jean P. Palutikof, Maureen D. Agnew & Mark R. Hoar, Public Perceptionsof
Unusually Warm Weather in the UK Impacts, Responses and Adaptations, 26 CLIMATE RES. 43,
57 (2004).
113. But note that this perception is not necessarily true, as some studies have predicted
negative climate change impacts in some northern latitudes. See, e.g., Tiffany Stecker, Climate
Change May Impair the Food Production of High-Latitude Countries, CLIMATEWIRE, Dec. 6,
2011, available at http://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2011/12/06/3.
114. It is possible that more permits might not translate to increased costs; one complex
permit might equal a few simpler ones. Nonetheless, the state implementation agencies perceive
such costs to be linear in the amount of permits. See Tailoring Rule, supra note 6 (discussing the
average expense per permit issued).
115. The EPA has already released a guidance document with its policies and
recommendations for state implementation agencies issuing permits to new stationary sources
under the Title V program. See AIR QUALiTY POLICY Div., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA457/B-11-001, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITIING GUIDANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GASES 17-46 (2011),
availableat http://www.epa.gov/nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingguidance.pdf.
116. It is possible that future best-available control technology requirements may produce
net cost savings to the regulated firms; nonetheless, I do not think that this is the common
perception among these industries, especially if they were not subject to regulation before.
117. eGRID2010 Version 1.1 Year 2007 Summary Tables, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENGY (May
2011),
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have the lowest carbon dioxide emission rate, while states abstaining
from the litigation have an emission rate that is slightly higher than
the emission rate of states challenging the EPA.
3. Public Opinion
Because no reliable survey data on residents' attitudes toward
climate change by state is available, 118 I use an indicator of general
support for environmental policy goals in the main analysis. 119
Specifically, I use the proportion of self-described environmentalists in
each state, as measured by a representative national survey of 5,213
respondents.1 20 This measure is meant to capture whether the state is
environmentalist friendly in general.1 2 1 I also create a variable that
reports how often "climate change" appears in local newspapers in
2001, using the Factiva database in order to identify states that
devote greater attention to this issue. According to Table 2, states
supporting the EPA have the highest proportion of self-described
environmentalists and the greatest mention of climate change in local
newspapers.

http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/documents/egridzips/eGRID2010Vl-l-yearO7-SummaryTables.
pdf. Using a different measure for the state carbon dioxide emissions does not change the
qualitative results. See the Appendix for sensitivity analyses.
118. There is a lot of information about national climate change attitudes, however. See, e.g.,
Thomas E. Curry & Howard Herzog, A Survey of Public Attitudes towards Climate Change and
Climate (Mass. Inst. Tech. Lab. for Energy & the Env't, Working Paper No. 2007-01, 2007),
available at http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/LFEE_2007_ 01_WP.pdf.
119. In fact, I create alternative measures for public support for the greenhouse gas permit
requirements in order to convince the reader that my results are robust regardless of my choice
of public opinion indicator. The coefficients on these public opinion proxies are never significant
in the regressions. See the Appendix for a discussion of all of these variables.
120. W. Kip Viscusi et al., National Drinking Water Survey of Households, KNOWLEDGE
NETWORKS (2008). The Knowledge Networks ("KN") panel is based on probability sampling of
both online and offline populations, providing the necessary hardware and Internet access if a
respondent does not have access to a computer or the Internet. For more information about the
KN National Drinking Water Survey, supra,see W. Kip Viscusi et al., DiscontinuousBehavioral
Responses to Recycling Laws and Plastic Water Bottle Deposits, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
121. Of course, the preferences of the voting population within the state are the truly
influential preferences, but as long as the proportion of environmentalists that vote is similar
across states, the variable will pick up relevant state differences in environmental preferences.
On the national level, scholars have found that those who vote tend to have higher
environmental valuations than those who do not vote. See Bell et al., supra note 83, at 667
(finding this result with respect to public valuation of national water quality levels).
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4. Demographic Variables
Scholars have identified the existence of a Kuznets curve for
environmental quality tastes. 2 2 Essentially, the curve represents the
hypothesis that as citizens' incomes increase, they care more about
environmental quality. 123 To control for this effect, I include GDP by
24
state from the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the main analysis.'
According to Table 2, states supporting the EPA have the highest GDP
per capita.
In addition, to ensure that the seacoast variable is not driven
by regional preferences associated with the South, I control for region
(Northeast, South, West, and Midwest) in all specifications. The
region variable picks up the unobserved characteristics of states that
vary by region. According to Table 2, a plurality of states supporting
the EPA are from the Northeast, while a majority of states challenging
the EPA are from the South.
5. Political Measures
Because the state attorney general, in consultation with the
governor, typically decides whether to intervene in litigation, 125 I use
the state attorney general's political affiliation at the start of 2010
(when states submitted petitions for intervention).126 I also indicate
whether the state was a "blue" state or a "red" state in the 2008
presidential election in my main analysis. Blue states went to the

122. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1992: DEVELOPMENT AND THE

ENVIRONMENT
(1992),
available at http://wdronline.worldbank.org//worldbank/a/c.html/
world-development-reportl992/chapterldevelopmentenvironmentfalsedichotomy
("As
incomes rise, the demand for improvements in environmental quality will increase, as will the
resources available for investment."); Sjak Smulders et al., Economic Growth and the Diffusion of
Clean Technologies: Explaining Environmental Kuznets Curves, 49 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON.
79, 80 (2011) ("Literature ... has generated a wealth of insights, providing evidence for the
existence of the [environmental Kuznets curve], in particular for short-lived regional air and
water pollutants.").
123. But there is dispute about whether the Kuznets curve exists for carbon dioxide. For
example, the United States, one of the richest countries in the world, has not passed
comprehensive greenhouse gas regulations by statute.
124. Gross Domestic Product By State, supra note 110. In sensitivity analyses, I also account
for state education; the inclusion of this variable does not change the qualitative results of
interest. See the Appendix.
125. Accordingly, the state attorney general is listed as bringing the lawsuit on most of the
petitions in this litigation. See, e.g., Petition of Massachusetts et al., supra note 50; Petition of
Nebraska et al., supranote 51.
126. As a robustness check, I also include a variable for the governor's political affiliation.
See the Appendix.
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Democratic candidate for President, then-Senator Barack Obama, and
red states went to the Republican candidate, Senator John McCain, in
the 2008 presidential election. 127 According to Table 2, the vast
majority of states supporting the EPA are blue states and many have
a Democratic attorney general, while states challenging the EPA are
predominantly red states and have a Republican attorney general.

127. In sensitivity analyses, I also use the Democrat-minus-Republican voting gap in the
2008 election, which represents the strength of the state's political preference toward the
Democratic Party. It allows me to distinguish states that just barely went blue, for example, in
the 2008 election. See the Appendix.
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2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLE CONSTRUCTS.

Independent Variables
Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Carbon dioxide output emission
rate (lb/MWh) (2007)
Public Opinion
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
News visibility

Climate Change Risk Measures
State has a seacoast
Average state latitude
Proportion state GDP from
farming (2008)
Demographic Variables
GDP per capita (2008)
Northeast
South
West
Midwest
PoliticalMeasures
Democratic attorney general
(2008)
Obama won state in 2008 (blue
state)

Pro-EPA
States

Con-EPA
States

Neutral
States

(19 states)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

(18 states)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

(13 states)
Mean
(Std. dev.)

1,003
(530)

1,463
(381)

1,476
(566)

0.46
(0.05)
152
(218)

0.37
(0.08)
112
(124)

0.40
(0.06)
103
(105)

0.63
(0.50)
41.01
(3.79)
0.01
(0.01)

0.56
(0.51)
37.34
(8.75)
0.02
(0.03)

0.08
(0.28)
40.19
(3.48)
0.02
(0.02)

39,920
(6,942)
0.42
0.16
0.26
0.16

34,087
(4,997)
0.00
0.56
0.17
0.28

34,489
(5,862)
0.08
0.31
0.23
0.38

0.84
(0.37)
0.95
(0.23)

0.28
(0.46)
0.28
(0.46)

0.77
(0.44)
0.43
(0.51)
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B. Empirical Specifications
I split my analysis into two sections. First, I analyze which
factors correlate with states joining the litigation as opposed to
remaining neutral. Then, I analyze the factors that correlate with the
states' decisions of whether to be pro-EPA or con-EPA, suggesting the

motivations behind picking sides in the litigation.
In the first analysis, I use a probit regression-that is, a binary
dependent variable model that produces maximum likelihood
estimates for the coefficients on independent variables-where all the
coefficients have been transformed to reflect the marginal effects on
the probability of entering the litigation. 128 In this model, the
dependent variable is equal to 1 if the state joined the litigation (on
either side of the dispute) and equal to 0 if otherwise. The independent
variables are those variables that are likely to influence the state's
decision to join the litigation.
The media has discussed one possible motivation for state
involvement: politics.

129

If the disputes over the EPA's regulations

come down to politics alone, then the attorney general with the most
to gain from entering the litigation is the one whose own political
affiliation matches the state's political affiliation. Meanwhile, the
states in which the two affiliations do not match are likely to stay out
of the controversy. To test this hypothesis, I interact a binary variable
that indicates when the state attorney general is a Democrat (AG
Dem) with the blue-state indicator (Blue State). If the coefficient on
the interaction term, f4, is positive and statistically significant, then
matching attorney general and state affiliation is associated with a
higher probability of entering the litigation.
Alternatively, the decision could be a mixture of both politics
and cost concerns. Here, I assume that Democrats are more likely to
support climate change mitigation regulations but that industry
constituents are not likely to support the regulations. 130 Hence, as
industry constituents are more important (represented by the
intensity of greenhouse gas emissions in the state), the conflicting
influences make it more difficult to enter the litigation on one side.
Accordingly, states with a Democrat as the attorney general and with

128. Coefficient estimates were calculated using the command "dprobit" in the econometric
software Stata. I could have used a linear probability model instead without any difference in
qualitative results.
129. Nelson, supra note 8.
130. This is not a strong assumption. See discussion infra Part IV.
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a high carbon dioxide emission rate would be especially likely to stay
out of the litigation, and vice versa. Hence, I interact the variable that
indicates that the state attorney general is a Democrat with a variable
that indicates that the carbon dioxide emission rate is below the
national average (Low EMR). I also interact the blue-state indicator
with the low emission rate variable for similar reasons. If the
coefficients on these interaction terms, fls and fl6 , are positive and
significant, then matching political affiliations and cost incentives are
associated with a higher probability of entering the litigation.
As a third possibility, I hypothesize that states whose local
newspapers publish more news articles about climate change are more
likely to enter the litigation (News Visibility). The greater attention to
climate change issues might indicate public salience of the regulations
and possible public demand for state action. Finally, I include a vector
of other controls (Other Controls), such as the state's GDP per capita
and the region. Below, I present this empirical specification:
Pr(Enter Litigation= 1)
= 0[flo + /3l(AG Dem) + fl2 (Blue State) + fl3 (Low EMR)
+ fl4 (AG Dem * Blue State) + fls(AG Dem * Low EMR)
+ fl 6 (Blue State * Low EMR) + fi 7 (News Visibility) + (Other Controls)y +

E]

In the second step of the analysis, I employ a linear probability
model using ordinary least squares ("OLS") regressions to
demonstrate the contribution of various factors on the state's decision
to enter the litigation on a particular side.' 31 I model the decisions to
intervene in the lawsuit on a particular side using three different
dependent variables. The first variable (Pro-EPA) is equal to 1 if the
state entered the litigation in support of the EPA's regulations and
equal to 0 if otherwise. The second variable (Con-EPA) is equal to 1 if
the state entered the litigation to challenge the EPA's regulations and
equal to 0 if otherwise. Finally, the Adjusted Pro-EPA variable is
equal to 1 if the state entered the litigation in support of the EPA's
regulations and equal to 0 if the state entered the litigation to
challenge the EPA's regulations, omitting the neutral states. This
allows me to analyze the decision to pick a side conditional on entering
the dispute in the first place. I split the data in three ways to give

131. I use a linear probability model in order to keep independent variables that predict the
outcome variable perfectly under certain groupings. For the variables that remain, the results
using probit regression are qualitatively the same.
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readers a better sense of how the states divided in their decisions. 132
The independent variables of interest are the political affiliation of the
state attorney general (AG Dem), an indicator of the state's overall
political affiliation (Blue State), the carbon dioxide emission rate (C02
EMR), an indicator for whether the state has a seacoast (Seacoast),
the proportion of the state's GDP that is attributed to farming
(FarmingGDP), the state's average latitude (Latitude), the proportion
of self-described environmentalists in the state (Environmentalists),
and a vector of other controls (Other Controls), such as the state's GDP
per capita and the region. As a representative example, I present the
Pro-EPA empirical specification:
Pro - EPA = flo + fl(AG Dem) + fl 2 (Blue State) + 3(C02 EMR) + 1 4 (Seacoast) + 1 5(Farming GDP)
+ 16 (Latitude) + f97(Environmentalists) + (Other Controls)y + E

III. RESULTS
A. Choice to Intervene
Table 3 presents the results for the factors that correlate with a
state's initial decision to intervene in the litigation. The results show
that states with a Democratic attorney general are less likely to enter
the greenhouse gas litigation, statistically significant at the one
percent level. Nonetheless, a Democratic attorney general in a blue
state is more likely to enter the litigation, statistically significant at
the ten percent level. Furthermore, states with matching political and
cost incentives are somewhat more likely to enter the litigation, but
this result is not statistically significant. Finally, news visibility is not
associated with an increased likelihood of entering the litigation.

132. Generally, a multinomial logit model is preferred when there are three outcomes (proEPA, con-EPA, and neutral), but the coefficients on such a model are not intuitive and more
difficult to interpret. I use OLS regressions in order to make the analysis more accessible to
readers. See Epstein et al., supra note 105, at 1814-15 (discussing the importance of presenting
empirical data in a way that is easy for readers to understand). The use of OLS regressions does
not change the qualitative results of the Note.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

222

[Vol. 65:1:189

TABLE 3. PROBIT INTERVENTION REGRESSION.

Entered GHG
Litigation

Independent Variables
Democratic attorney general
Blue state in 2008
Low carbon dioxide emission rate
News visibility, divided by 1,000
Interaction: Democratic attorney general *
Blue state
Interaction: Democratic attorney general *
Low carbon dioxide emission rate
Interaction: Blue state * Low carbon dioxide
emission rate
Observations

-0.497***
(0.162)
-0.135
(0.193)
-0.039
(0.235)
-0.065
(0.365)
0.393*
(0.213)
0.177
(0.223)
0.085
(0.299)
50

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Probit coefficients have been
transformed to reflect the marginal effects on the probability of intervention. See Table 2 for
definitions of variables. Demographic variables included in the equations but not reported are
state GDP per capita and regional controls for Northeast, South, and West (with Midwest as the
omitted category). The coefficients on these variables are not statistically significant.
Sp<
0.10.
**
p < 0.05.
Sp < 0.01.

This brief analysis, focusing on the commonalities between
states that enter the litigation regardless of the side, suggests that
politics might be an important factor in the states' decisions to litigate.
In the next Section, I explore this hypothesis while controlling for
various other potential determinants of a state's decision to pick a side
in the litigation.
B. Picking Sides
In this Section, I analyze the states' decisions to enter the
litigation either in support of or against the EPA's regulations. The
dependent variables, discussed in Part II, are whether the state
entered pro-EPA, whether the state entered con-EPA, and whether
the state entered pro-EPA excluding the neutral states.
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TABLE 4. PICKING SIDES OLS REGRESSION.

Independent Variables
Democratic attorney general
Blue state in 2008
Carbon dioxide emission rate,
divided by 1,000
State has a seacoast
Proportion state GDP from
farming, multiplied by 10
Average state latitude
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
GDP per capita, divided by
10,000
Constant

(1)
1 if Pro-

(2)
1 if Con-

EPA, 0
otherwise

otherwise

0.327***
(0.118)
0.529***
(0.169)
-0.165
(0.117)
0.029

-0.500***
(0.097)
-0.257

(0.151)

(0.170)
0.167

0.410
(0.248)
0.009

(0.161)
0.164
(0.135)
0.417**

(0.296)
-0.008

(0.010)

(0.010)

-0.298
(0.739)
0.069
(0.092)
-0.588

-0.793
(0.909)
-0.093

(0.520)
Observations
R-squared

EPA, 0

50
0.589

(0.070)
1.456**
(0.563)
50
0.652

(3)
1 if ProEPA, 0 if
Con-EPA
0.404***
(0.123)
0.590***
(0.193)
-0.207*
(0.116)
-0.240
(0.177)
0.317
(0.317)
0.009
(0.010)
-0.802
(0.863)
0.152*
(0.076)
-0.531

(0.475)
37
0.792

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 for definitions of
variables. Regional controls for Northeast, South, and West are included but not reported, with
Midwest as the omitted category. The coefficients on the regional controls are not statistically
significant.
*
p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.

The results indicate that state political affiliation matters.
States with a Democratic attorney general are statistically
significantly more likely to enter the litigation in support of the EPA,
while states with a Republican attorney general are less likely to
support the EPA. 133 In addition, in specifications (1) and (3), I find
133. This follows because the indicator for a Republican attorney general is essentially the
inverse of the indicator for a Democratic attorney general. Hence, the coefficient is exactly the
same, but negative, when I instead use the Republican attorney general indicator in the
analysis. See the Appendix for sensitivity analyses using the state governor's political affiliation.
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that states that voted for President Obama in the 2008 presidential
election are also more likely to enter the litigation in support of the
EPA, even when controlling for the affiliation of the state attorney
general. 34 Despite the strong influence of politics, the coefficient on
the carbon dioxide emission rate is also statistically significant at the
ten percent level in specification (3). That is, among the states that
entered the litigation, those with a higher carbon dioxide emission
rate are significantly less likely to enter the litigation in support of the
EPA, even controlling for the state attorney general's political
135 It
affiliation and the state's vote in the 2008 presidential election.
seems that the carbon dioxide emission rate exerts a separate, but less
robust, influence on top of the political affiliation variables.
Perhaps surprisingly, the proxy for the strength of the state's
citizens' tendency to support environmental policy goals is largely
insignificant. 136 Similarly, indicators of the level of risk that the state
might face should climate change occur are largely insignificant. In
the one instance when the coefficient on a risk indicator is statistically
significant (specification (2)), it is significant in the direction opposite
my predictions. The results show that a state with a seacoast is
associated with about a 0.42 higher probability of challenging the
EPA's greenhouse gas regulations, even when controlling for region
(Northeast, South, Midwest, and West). Zahran et al. find a similar
137
counterintuitive result for seacoasts.
Finally, according to Table 4, among the states that entered the
litigation, those with higher GDP per capita are statistically
13 8
significantly more likely to enter the litigation to support the EPA.

134. This also means that states that went to Senator McCain in the 2008 election (red
states) were less likely to enter the litigation in support of the EPA. This is because the indicator
for blue states is the inverse of the indicator for red states. Hence, the coefficient is exactly the
same, but negative, when I use the red-state indicator in the analysis.
135. I also use the average emissions rate per capita. The results are largely the same, albeit
not statistically significant in some specifications. See the Appendix.
136. This result holds even when I use a variable for the response to a survey question
specifically on support for carbon dioxide regulation, an index that averages polling questions on
environmental policies, the local news visibility of climate change articles, the percent of the
public voting for Ralph Nader in 2000, and the proportion of the residents that are members of
environmental organizations; the result is not sensitive to my choice of variable for my main
analysis. See the Appendix. Nonetheless, to the extent that climate change attitudes are
correlated with political affiliation, the politics variables could pick up some of the influence of
public opinion. I discuss this possibility infra in Part IV.A.2.
137. Zahran et al., supra 69, at 783; see also discussion supranote 99.
138. As income increases, individuals can invest more attention to issues such as the
environment. See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 94, at 1680 (noting that individuals'
willingness to contribute financially to environmental efforts tracks income level).
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This result is consistent with studies on individual environmental
139
attitudes.

IV. DISCUSSION
A. Politics as Usual: Now What?
Politics matter. A state attorney general's political affiliationas well as the state's political affiliation-primarily drives the state's
decision to enter the greenhouse gas litigation. 140 The coefficients on
these variables are statistically significant in all specifications. In
contrast, the other coefficients either are not consistently statistically
significant or are statistically significant in the direction opposite of
my predictions. Potential future costs do not seem to have an effect
separate from that of politics. Measures of risks due to climate
change-whether the state has a seacoast and the proportion of state
GDP attributed to farming-have no consistent effect on a state's
decision to intervene. In fact, in a few specifications, a higher risk of
damages from climate change is associated with a higher likelihood to
enter the litigation against the EPA's position, even after controlling
for politics and potential future costs, among other things.
The results are certainly unexpected given the Supreme
Court's representation of the states' reasons for involvement in
Massachusetts v. EPA. 141 Those stated reasons may have been
sufficient to establish standing, but the implications of actual political
motivations are normatively relevant because state intervention may
influence the progression of the greenhouse gas cases. 142 Two
questions guide this analysis: (1) What does the influence of politics
mean; and (2) what jurisprudential weight should courts place on

139. Id.
140. The results of this analysis could also hold when states intervene in other litigation, not
just in greenhouse gas litigation. Interestingly, one empirical analysis of participation rates in
multistate consumer protection litigation found that the attorneys general "do not regulate
strictly along party lines." Provost, supra note 21, at 615. I leave open the question of how the
importance of politics varies along different types of litigation for future analysis and focus on
the implications for greenhouse gas litigation.
141. See discussion supra Part I.
142. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. Some scholars, such as Professor Hari
Osofsky, believe that-because climate change presents a governance-scale challengeintergovernmental litigation is appropriate and necessary. Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing
Importance of Climate Change Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 3, 15 (2010). There is room for
disagreement as to the utility of state involvement based on this Note's findings regarding the
states' underlying motivations.
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state involvement in greenhouse gas litigation? Of course, the answer
to the first question affects how we think about the second question.
In this Part, I argue that the answers to these questions raise
concerns about the political motivations behind state decisions to
intervene.
1. Politics as ... Politics
The analysis shows that political reasons drive the states'
decisions to intervene in the greenhouse gas litigation, a result that
some might find unsurprising. 143 The robust influence of politics could
stem from the nature of climate change risks--characterized by some
low probability catastrophic events and much uncertainty-that make
the issue conducive for political takeover. 144 To some, the result might
also suggest that political battles-instead of legal ones-will play out
in the courtroom. 145 If states' involvement affects the course of the
litigation, then it is worthwhile to consider whether the involvement is
appropriate. If the underlying issues necessitate more political
balancing than legal interpretation, then the resolution of these issues
in the courtroom may be undesirable. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that political battles do not belong in a judicial
forum. The Court has reasoned that "[t]he responsibilities for
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle
between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones:

143. See discussion supra note 86. This result does suggest, however, that determining the
side a state will take given its politics is not that unpredictable. Cf Lemos, supra note 11, at
n. 102 (arguing that "every case has two sides, and state politics can be unpredictable").
144. Economists W. Kip Viscusi and James T. Hamilton have previously found that the
EPA's decisions regarding the management of hazardous waste sites appeared to be influenced
by politics. See W. Kip Viscusi & James T. Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational? Evidence
from Hazardous Waste Cleanup Decisions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1010, 1024 (1999). They argued
that when risks are "low," politics really seem to matter. Id. at 1020.
145. The Supreme Court has consistently held that political battles do not belong in a
judicial forum. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
864-65 (1984) ('The arguments over policy that are advanced in the parties' briefs create the
impression that respondents are now waging in a judicial forum a specific policy battle .... Such
policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges. ...
Perhaps that body consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level,
thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the
provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the question at
this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question,
and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme devised by the agency. For
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.").
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Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political
1 46
branches."
In the climate change discussion, the "political branches" have
come to a standstill. In fact, the EPA's recent activity in regulating
greenhouse gases under the CAA is partly a response to Congress's
ineffectiveness in developing a coherent, national system for
regulating greenhouse gases. 147 Although there is a growing consensus
in the scientific community that the continuing intensity of carbon
dioxide emissions can cause potentially catastrophic effects by way of
climate change, 148 the issue continues to be politically divisive-and
consequently immobilizing-in Congress. 149 But unavoidably, the
sensible regulation of greenhouse gases will require many political
decisions. 150 One view is that courts especially should not invite these
discussions into the courtroom, but rather should force Congress's
hand. This close-minded view, however, fails to consider the potential
benefits a state can bring to litigation matters of this type. A state can
enter litigation for political reasons, but nevertheless sufficiently
146. Id. at 866 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 195 (1978)).
147. If Congress does create such a system, it would likely preempt EPA regulation-either
explicitly or implicitly.
148. See, e.g., Rajendra Pachauri, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Opening of the 16th Session of the Conference of the Parties at Cancun, Mexico (Nov. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/news_and~events/docs/COP16/StatementCancunDrPachauri.pdf
(discussing the dangers posed by ongoing climate change). But see Brief of Amici Curiae
Scientists in Support of Petitioners Supporting Reversal, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v.
EPA, No. 09-1322 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2011) (arguing that the "primary drivers of the Earth's
climate system have been, and will continue to be, natural (non-anthropogenic) forces").

149. Jean Chemnick, Increased PartisanshipHurts Future Chances for Consensus on Energy,
Climate Policy, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, June 28, 2011, available at http://www.eenews.net
/EEDaily/print/2011/06/28/1; see also LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 12 (finding widely
diverging beliefs among the public about the amount of attention that Congress and the
President should give to environmental issues). There has been a host of failed climate change
regulation. For a discussion of how a 2010 bipartisan-proposed legislation was put together, and
how it ultimately failed, see Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns: How the Senate and the White

House Missed Their Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010,
at 70, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/
101011fa fact lizza. Even now, multiple groups in the House and the Senate have been trying to
delay the EPA rules or to completely strip the EPA of power to regulate greenhouse gases. These
measures have so far failed as well. See, e.g., Jean Chemnick, With Stand-Alone Bills at a
Standstill, Riders Take Center Stage, ENVT & ENERGY DAILY, Apr. 8, 2011, available at
to stall
EPA
(discussing measures
http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/print/2011/04/08/2
regulation).
150. For example, what social cost of carbon should we use to determine the stringency of
future regulations? Should we consider the effects on international populations? See generally
Masur & Posner, supra note 45, at 1563 (discussing some of the limits of cost-benefit analysis
resulting from the political decisions that need to be made).
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argue legal intricacies-and perhaps this is a role that the
Constitution welcomes. Because the states are up against the federal
government-represented by the EPA-state involvement could alert
courts to federalism concerns that are appropriate for the courts to
resolve. 5 1 The CAA in particular was enacted with an aim for
"cooperative federalism" between the states and the federal
government. 52 A legal battle pitting states against states against the
federal government could illustrate the failure of cooperative
federalism to minimize these disputes. Furthermore, as long as good
reasons exist for state involvement, the actual motivation may not
matter.
Alternatively, politically motivated involvement by states may
act as a check on the courts. If politics are already an elephant in the
courtroom when controversial issues relating to climate change are
litigated, then state intervention could serve an important functionensuring that politics are not settled in the courtroom without the
involvement of democratically accountable bodies and without the
appropriate level of media attention and scrutiny. Even if politics
serve such a function, in Part IV.B, I present a solution to the
potential federalism, accountability, and transparency problems that I
believe would better aid both the courts and state residents.
2. Politics as Public Opinion
On the other hand, political factors, such as the state attorney
general's political affiliation and whether President Obama won the
state in the 2008 presidential election, may serve as more than just
obvious proxies for the political position of a state. These factors may
also be proxies for state public opinion on the regulation of greenhouse
gases. State involvement on behalf of its citizens' interests is a
Supreme Court-sanctioned state interest in litigation under the
doctrine of parens patriae. In this Section, I discuss whether this
explanation holds any water.
In order for this explanation to survive, the political affiliation
variables would have to be better proxies for such public opinion than
the indicator of support for environmental policy goals that I use in
151. Few scholars discuss the normative issue of what jurisprudential weight courts should
give to state attorney general filings, with the exception of Solimine, supra note 10, who
discusses this issue with regard to amicus brief filings to the Supreme Court.
152. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(a)(4) ("Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for
the development of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and
control air pollution.").
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my main analysis or the five other variables that I consider in my
sensitivity analyses. 153 Those proxies do not produce any significantor even consistent-results in my regressions, while the political
variables are statistically robust in all specifications. At first glance,
this is possible. Researchers at the Yale Project on Climate Change
Communication found differences in climate change beliefs that follow
partisan lines. 154 Nationally, eighty-one percent of Democrats think
that global warming is happening, as compared to forty-seven percent
of Republicans; and seventy-eight percent of Democrats are at least
somewhat worried about global warming, as compared to thirty-two
percent of Republicans. 55 Supporting this relationship, the correlation
between the proportion of self-described environmentalists per state
and whether President Obama won the state in the 2008 presidential
156
election is 0.65 in my dataset.
However, even if politics is a proxy for public opinion, the
state's reliance on public opinion may still raise concerns for several
reasons. First, the state's reliance on public opinion may be
problematic because many citizens are drastically uninformed about
climate change issues. 15 7 For example, the Yale researchers found that
only nineteen percent of Americans know that carbon dioxide stays in
the atmosphere hundreds to thousands of years after it has been
emitted, and twelve percent believe that beneficial global warming is
happening. Perhaps even more disturbing, the researchers also found
that forty-three percent of Americans incorrectly believe that if we
stopped punching holes in the ozone layer with rockets, then we would
reduce global warming.1 58 These are dramatic misconceptions; if
153. See the Appendix. Also, I note that the justification possibility described in this Section
fits better with the general state political affiliation variables (such as the state votes in the 2008
presidential election) than with the political affiliation of the state attorney general because the
attorney general's political affiliation is less likely to be representative of the public's overall
political sentiment.
154. Climate Note: PartisanViews of Climate Change, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COMM. (Oct. 27, 2010), http://environment.yale.edu/climate/news/the-climate-note-climatechange-by-political-party/.
155. Id.
156. This was the highest correlation among my many state public opinion proxies, none of
which had statistically significant coefficients. The correlations between my other public opinion
proxies and the state's vote ranged from 0.0721 (the response to the single polling question
regarding the regulation of carbon dioxide) to 0.5085 (the proportion that are members in
environmental organizations).
157. See LEISEROWITZ ET AL., supra note 94, at 3 (concluding generally that "many
Americans lack some of the knowledge needed for informed decision-making in a democratic
society").
158. Id. at 11-12.
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properly informed, or with the appropriate motivation to acquire
knowledge, individuals' attitudes about climate change presumably
would be different. Specifically, if individuals believed that climate
change is a real threat to future wellbeing, then they would be more
likely to support climate change mitigation. 159 Hence, the states'
reliance on largely uninformed opinions would be troubling.
Second, even if political affiliation variables represent average,
informed public preferences, reliance on these political variables may
still be inaccurate. This is because politicians respond to the median
voter's preferences as opposed to mean societal environmental
preferences, which tend to be higher. 160 As Jason Bell, Joel Huber, and
W. Kip Viscusi explain, "Political processes based on median
preferences of the public undervalue the environment. This shortfall is
mitigated in part by the higher environmental valuations of people
who vote, as compared to those who do not. But this influence is not
sufficiently great to fully offset the mean-median disparity." 161 Hence,
even if we think the state is using politics in order to act on behalf of
public opinion, there is reason for concern relating to uninformed
opinions and the inaccurate measurement of those opinions.
Nonetheless, the other results suggest that the state is
probably not acting on behalf of public opinion. For one, the results
show that states' positions are sensitive to the state carbon dioxide
emission rate. A higher carbon dioxide emission rate could proxy for
the influence of industry positions on the states' politicians. Industry
groups have already filed lawsuits against the EPA on their own
behalf. 62 While states acting on behalf of general public opinion might
be justifiable, states acting on behalf of industry might be improper.
On the other hand, industries often transfer higher costs of
production to consumers in the form of higher utility costs, for
example. It is possible that states could be worried about these costs

159. See Zahran et al., supra note 69, at 772 (noting that there is an "ecological assumption
that a person's physical vulnerability to climate change may be a pertinent factor in explaining
his or her support for government climate change policies"). The research group led by Sammy
Zahran found that individuals' risk perceptions were strongly associated with climate policy
support. Id. at 784.
160. Bell et al.,
supranote 83, at 667.
161. Id.
162. For example, the National Association of Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute,
Brick Industry Association, Corn Refiners Association, National Association of Home Builders,
National Oilseed Processors Association, National Petrochemical and Refiners Association, and
Western States Petroleum Association have filed lawsuits against the EPA. See Brief of NonState Petitioners and Supporting Intervenors, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No.
10- 1073 (D.C. Cir. June 20, 2011).
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on behalf of their citizens. Such reasoning would suggest that the
sensitivity to industry costs is just another way the state is concerned
about its citizens' welfare. Consistent with this view, poorer states are
163
more likely to challenge the EPA greenhouse gas regulations.
Nonetheless, without some assessment of the benefits of the
regulations to these states, such considerations could still be
misguided. They may represent a myopic focus on short-term costs,
instead of the balancing of the costs against the likely discounted
benefits.
Hence, seen in the best light, the states' use of politics as a
proxy for public opinion or likely welfare under climate change
mitigation regulation seems one sided. This problem is underscored in
the results because, when the coefficients on risk perceptions are
statistically significant in the regression, the signs of the risk
coefficients are in the wrong direction.164 Clearly, states are not paying
attention to these risk factors in a consistent way. The results suggest
that at least some of the states with more to lose from climate change
are the most willing to risk climate change. In some cases, this seems
to be due to the high short-term costs, while in others, it suggests the
result of pure politics.
3. Courts: Tread Carefully
For the above reasons, courts should tread carefully before
putting jurisprudential weight in their decisions on state involvement
in the greenhouse gas litigation. If instead states were litigating
because of the differential impacts of climate change that were
obscured by a national-level cost-benefit analysis, then their decisions
could provide information for the court regarding potential failings in
the EPA's procedure. 165 However, the empirical results show that the
worthwhile information relating to public opinion or regarding the
incidence of climate change risks and the costs of mitigation strategies

163. See Cragg & Kahn, supranote 91, at 18 (finding that representatives from poorer states
were more likely to oppose climate change mitigation legislation).
164. I refer to the results on state seacoasts.
165. We can analogize this to how administrative law has balanced the need for some
judicial oversight of agency action without having courts set policy. See generally Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("[I]f the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."). In this case, a policy can be netgood for the whole country, but not necessarily net-good for each state individually-and this
information could be useful to courts in deciding whether the federal government has crossed
any federalism lines.
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is not significantly correlated with the decisions to intervene in the
litigation on behalf of one of the sides. This suggests that courts
should tread carefully before giving the states' arguments heavy
jurisprudential weight. Below, I propose a change that could make
useful state involvement easier to spot.
B. State-Specific Analysis by the EPA
Regardless of whether one believes that political motivations
make state intervention inappropriate 166 or whether one more
narrowly believes that state intervention could be meaningful but only
if motivations are properly disclosed, 16 7 the courtroom should not be
the first place where federalism and state-specific cost and benefit
differences are taken up. The CAA was meant to strike the
appropriate balance between federal and state power. Therefore,
state-level implications should first be analyzed at the agency level.
To prevent this omission in the future, the President, through
an executive order, should require executive agencies, such as the
EPA, to prepare state-specific (mini) cost-benefit analyses of major
environmental regulations. 16 3 This solution has two main benefits: (1)
it reveals any uneven distributions of the costs and benefits of policies;
and (2) it promotes transparency-with respect to decisions by both
agency regulators and state policymakers.
An analysis of state distributional concerns would point out
whether the costs of a nationally cost-justified regulation fall
disproportionally on some states or whether the benefits
disproportionally accrue to other states. Analyses emphasizing
differences in costs and benefits would promote the development of
cooperative and honest solutions, such as state offset programs, 69 in
166. That is, if one roughly believes that the court is not the appropriate forum for political
battles when more democratic means (such as deliberations in Congress) fail.
167. For example, if one believes that such motivations appropriately express federalism
concerns.
168. This requirement would be similar to the requirement to prepare a regulatory impact
analysis for major regulations. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993)
(requiring agencies to conduct a cost-benefit assessment for any matter identified to be a
"significant regulatory action").
169. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 91, at 19 (suggesting an offset-system solution after
analyzing representatives' voting patterns). A cap-and-trade program could also promote a more
efficient cost and benefit allocation. Some states are already requesting that the EPA allow them
to implement their own regional programs to meet any EPA carbon dioxide standards. See
Gabriel Nelson, States, Utilities Ask EPA to Boost Regional Cap-and-Trade Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/04/19/19greenwire-states-utilities-ask-epa-toboost-regional-cap-98267.html (noting that California, New York, and Minnesota are requesting
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which states that disproportionally benefit from a regulation could
subsidize states that disproportionally bear the regulation's cost. By
systematically disclosing these important considerations, the proposed
analyses could mobilize politicians to keep political decisions out of
courts and pass legislation that is better suited to respond to these
concerns. Further, state-specific cost-benefit analyses for major
environmental regulations may bring better regulatory alternatives to
light by explicitly considering more equitable state-level results. 17
Even if disagreements still end up in the courtroom, the
reasons behind states' intervention would be clearer to courts. With
state costs and benefits revealed, political ploys by state leaders would
be more transparent, and courts could either block intervention in
those cases or at least determine the appropriate jurisprudential
weight to give to those states. The increased transparency would also
allow the public to hold state decisionmakers accountable for their
reasons for participating in environmental litigation.
This solution also has the benefit of being implementable.
There is already a "federalism" executive order 171 and a regulatory
impact analysis executive order; 172 either could be amended to include
a state-specific cost-benefit requirement. In addition, the EPA already
does separate impact analyses for small businesses, 173 for example, so
there is institutional familiarity with such an approach.

to meet federal climate change rules by crafting cap-and-trade plans like those adopted by
California and a handful of northeastern states). Forcing the EPA to consider impacts at the
state level could also encourage the agency to learn from states' experiences with greenhouse gas
regulation. See Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate Change,
27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 231, 233 (2009).
170. For example, even within the CAA, some scholars have advocated regulation of
greenhouse gases under other provisions of the Act. See, e.g., Jonas Monast, Tim Profeta & David
Cooley, Avoiding the Glorious Mess: A Sensible Approach to Climate Change and the Clean Air
Act 2 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished working paper), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.
edu/climate/policydesign/avoiding-the-glorious-mess (summarizing why the authors recommend
regulation under section 111 of the CAA).
171. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). This executive order
actually relates to federal laws that will preempt state laws. See generally Catherine M.
Sharkey, FederalismAccountability: "Agency-Forcing"Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2156 (2009)
('The Executive Order requires that federal agencies, to the extent possible, refrain from limiting
state policy options, consult with states before taking action that might restrict states' policy
options, and take such actions only when clear constitutional authority exists and the problem is
of national scope.").
172. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 168.
173. See the requirements of Exec. Order No. 13,272, mandated by the Regulatory Flexibility
Act. 67 Fed. Reg. 53,461 (Aug. 13, 2002) ("Agencies shall thoroughly review draft rules to assess
and take appropriate account of the impact on small business .... ").
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State-level analysis for major environmental regulations could
also be in the interests of the states. Many of the con-EPA states could
face disastrous consequences if climate change proceeds. Of course,
climate change mitigation strategies face opposition precisely because,
while the costs of regulating carbon dioxide are large and relatively
certain, both the size and the certainty of benefits resulting from
mitigation are less understood. Further, states may weigh the
probability of climate change impacts very differently such that
agency state-specific analyses could engender controversy and
disagreement. 174 To the extent that the agency relies on homogeneous
assumptions regarding many of the uncertainties, however, the
relative impacts between states could provide meaningful information
to state decisionmakers.
To the extent that there are uncertainties inherent in assessing
the impact of climate change, there is a disadvantage to implementing
this solution. In fact, some scholars have argued that cost-benefit
analysis is too limited to be a useful tool in climate change policy. 175
While I agree that cost-benefit analysis has its limitations, it still
provides a rational framework for making scientific, political, and
economic decisions transparent. The transparency itself has benefitstransparency in cost-benefit analysis has previously benefitted
176
environmental goals.

174. I note, however, that the irreversibility of climate change damage and observed societal
risk aversion should play a large role in these determinations. See David Archer & Victor
Brovkin, The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of Anthropogenic C02, 90 CLIMATE CHANGE 283,
294 (2008) ("[T]he substantial fraction of projected C02 emissions will stay in the atmosphere for
millennia, and a part of fossil fuel C02 will remain in atmosphere for many thousands of
years."); Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation,Uncertainty, and
Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312, 312 (1974) ("Any discussion of public policy in the face of
uncertainty must come to grips with the problem of determining an appropriate attitude toward
risk on the part of the policy maker."); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to
Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. SCI. 1704, 1709 (2009) ("[W]e have quantified
how societal decisions regarding carbon dioxide concentrations that have already occurred or
could occur in the coming century imply irreversible dangers relating to climate change for some
illustrative populations and regions."); Michael Gerst, Research Assistant Professor, Dartmouth
Coll., Agent-Based Integrated Assessment Modeling (Feb. 18, 2011), http://engineering
.vanderbilt.edu/News/CalendarEventltem/11-02-15/CEE_Seminar_-_AGENT-BASED_
INTEGRATED.ASSESSMENTMODELING.aspx (accounting for societal risk aversion implies
that "climate change policy should focus primarily on the avoidance of climate-induced economic
catastrophes through precautionary mitigation").
175. Masur & Posner, supra note 45, at 1563 (framing the inability to avoid political
questions as a limitation of cost-benefit analysis for climate change policymaking).
176. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1201 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that NHTSA's failure to monetize benefits of greenhouse gas emissions reductions was
arbitrary and capricious).
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Others worry that because the use of cost-benefit analysis in
climate change mitigation policy would inevitably involve an account
of climate change benefits, it could potentially entrench and mobilize a
group of climate change beneficiaries that could further complicate
policymaking. 17 This concern is with the transparency of cost-benefit
analysis itself. Nonetheless, I still argue that there are positive effects
of disclosure that outweigh potential negative effects. For one, people
may mistakenly perceive themselves to be climate change winners
when they are not, which unnecessarily holds up mitigation policy. 178
More fundamentally, however, the results of my analysis suggest that
states currently fall along party lines in terms of support of or
opposition to climate change mitigation policy. If, instead, states were
to fall along cost and benefit lines, then the contentious political
alliances that typically do not lead to productive solutions could break
apart, potentially opening up conversations about solutions, such as
offset systems.
Finally, some may argue that this solution would unnecessarily
increase costs for the agency. As it stands, the regulatory impact
179
analyses required by Executive Order 12,866 can be expensive.
However, the state-specific analyses for major environmental
regulations need not be as detailed as the national-level cost-benefit
analysis and could include qualitative-as opposed to quantitativeconsiderations. For example, the impact assessments in the European
Union could serve as a model. These are frequently significantly
shorter than the regulatory impact analyses in the United States and
80
focus on qualitative impacts.

177. See Ruhl, supranote 85.
178. See Stecker, supra note 113.
179. See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory
Decisions?, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 67, 80 (2008) (estimating that regulatory impact analysis costs
about $72 million annually).
180. See generally Caroline Cecot et al., An Evaluation of the Quality of Impact Assessment
in the European Union with Lessons for the US and the EU, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 405, 407
(2008) ('The [European Union] makes far-reaching assessment manageable through the
standard of proportionate analysis, where the depth of the analysis is proportional to the likely
impact of the initiative."). Meanwhile, the U.S. regulatory impact analyses require monetization
of impacts whenever possible. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 168.

236

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:1:189

CONCLUSION

States' decisions on whether to join the greenhouse gas
litigation are strongly associated with state political affiliations and
have little relationship with various measures of public opinion or of
the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. State motivations
underlying intervention are relevant because state involvement can
change the progression of the litigation. Given the likely political
motivations, courts should tread carefully before placing too much
jurisprudential weight on the states' intervention decisions and
arguments.
A potential solution that allows distributional, economic, and
political concerns to be aired while providing transparency is for the
EPA to prepare brief state-specific analyses of the costs and benefits of
proposed major environmental regulations. Battles over climate
change mitigation, in particular, are often over intersections between
scientific and political questions. To the extent that these questions
arise, the state-specific analyses will ensure that the resulting
decisions are transparent.
The problems that the United States faces with respect to
setting climate policy-disparate incidence of costs and benefits and
different perceptions of risk or risk aversion-are suggestive of the
international problems that prevent agreement on climate change
mitigation.1 8 ' Untangling the meaningful disagreements can pave the
way for honest discussion of these issues in the United States. Such
discussion could help shed light on workable solutions for the world.
In addition, this Note's findings that the state positions in the
greenhouse gas litigation are largely determined by the political
affiliation of the state attorney general could be relevant when state
attorneys general litigate in other areas. Some scholars have argued
that, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions limiting class actions in
Dukes v. Walmart and in ATT v. Concepcion, state attorneys general
could become the primary protectors of citizens' rights, a role formerly

181. Economists have already proposed solutions to some of these problems in the
international arena. See, e.g., Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participationand
Compliance in InternationalClimate Change Agreements, 3 INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L.
349, 360
(2003),
available at http:/www.hks.harvard.edulm-rcbg/eephu
& ECON.
Ibarrett-stavins.pdf ("One form of positive incentive for participation and compliance is a side
payment-a direct money transfer made by one party or set of parties to another. Under such
arrangements, the countries that gain most from an agreement compensate those who would lose
or gain least (in the absence of side payments).").
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played by large class-action lawsuits.1 8 2 Their ability to perform such a
role could be undermined if, as appears to be the case in greenhouse
83
gas litigation, the state attorneys general are just blowing hot air.
Caroline Cecot*

182. See, e.g., Gilles & Friedman, supra note 74 (manuscript at 5) (predicting that state
attorneys general will make broader use of their parens patriae authority to represent the
interests of their citizens in cases that used to be brought as class actions).
183. The results of this Note would advise scrutiny of the motivations behind the positions of
state attorneys general for other types of litigation as well. See discussion supra notes 82, 140.
Vanderbilt University Law School, Doctor of Philosophy student in Law and Economics
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APPENDIX

A. Sensitivity Analysis
This Section presents the results of various sensitivity analyses
using alternate variables to demonstrate the robustness of the
qualitative results.
1. Climate Change Risk Measures
For sensitivity analyses, I create a variable that denotes the
contribution of the "agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting"
(agriculture) industry to state GDP using 2008 data from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. 8 4 The agriculture variable is highly correlated
with the farming variable (99.51 percent), so I use only the farming
variable in my main analysis. The qualitative results do not change
when I use the agriculture variable instead; the coefficient on the risk
measure is still statistically insignificant. Finally, when I include both
variables in the regression, the coefficients remain insignificant, and
the qualitative results remain the same.
I also model agricultural outcome risks using a measure of lost
agricultural profits by state from an empirical study by economists
Olivier Desch~nes and Michael Greenstone.18 5 I do not use this
measure in my main analysis because the study does not provide lost
profits for Alaska and Hawaii, and it groups the results for some
smaller states. Nonetheless, when I include the variable with a
missing variable indicator for Alaska and Hawaii, its coefficient is not
statistically significant, but the missing variable indicator is
statistically significant. The main results stay qualitatively the same,
except that the coefficient on the regional indicator for the West
becomes statistically significant in two specifications, implying that
western states are somewhat less likely to enter the litigation to
challenge the EPA as compared to midwestern states (the omitted
category).
Finally, I include a variable that indicates the changes in GDP
from estimated precipitation impacts based on a scientific study of
expected precipitation changes associated with catastrophic climate

184. Gross Domestic ProductBy State, supra note 110.
185. Oliver Desch~nes & Michael Greenstone, The Economic Impacts of Climate Change:
Evidence from Agricultural Output and Random Fluctuationsin Weather, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 354
(2007).
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change, done by the Sandia National Laboratories.18 6 These risks are
important; the EPA found that "[i]ncreases in the frequency of heavy
precipitation events are associated with increased risk of deaths and
18 7 I
injuries as well as infectious, respiratory, and skin diseases.
exclude this variable from my main analysis because the study did not
create GDP-change estimates for Alaska and Hawaii, and the modeled
expected precipitation changes are unlikely to be very salient for
policymakers and residents. In addition, a discussion of the
reasonableness, appropriateness, or result sensitivity of the various
assumptions (such as the weight given to tail risks of catastrophic
climate change events) in the model used by Sandia Laboratories is
beyond the scope of this study.1 8 8 Nonetheless, excluding this variable
does not significantly alter my main qualitative results. When I
include the variable with a missing variable indicator for Alaska and
Hawaii, its coefficient is not statistically significant, but the missing
variable indicator is statistically significant. Notably, the inclusion of
this variable results in a statistically significant (at the five percent
level) public opinion variable in one specification. In this case, a
higher percent of environmentalists is associated with a lower
probability of entering the litigation to challenge the EPA. This is the
only specification that results in a statistically significant coefficient
on any public opinion variable. The coefficients on the political
variables remain similar in magnitude and statistically significant
regardless of the climate change risk measure used in the analysis.
Table 5 below presents the results when I include all of the
alternate specifications.

186. GEORGE BACKUS ET AL., SANDIA NAT'L LABS., ASSESSING THE NEAR-TERM RISK OF
CLIMATE UNCERTAINTY: INTERDEPENDENCIES AMONG THE U.S. STATES (2010), available at

https://cfwebprod.sandia.gov/cfdocs/CCIMdocs/ClimateRiskAssessment.pdf; see also Robert
Adler, National Lab Calculates State-by-State Climate Change Risks (July 24, 2010),
http://www.suite1l.com/content/national-lab-calculates-state-by-state-climate-change-risksa265507#ixzz14KvulL5C.
187. Endangerment Finding, supra note 3, at 66,525.
188. But see, e.g., Masur & Posner, supra note 45, at 1577-87 (claiming some inappropriate
use of climate change models by the Interagency Working Group).
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TABLE 5. CLIMATE CHANGE RISK MEASURES
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.

(1)

1 if ProIndependent Variables
Democratic attorney general
Blue state in 2008
Carbon dioxide emission rate,
divided by 1,000
State has a seacoast
Proportion state GDP from
agriculture, multiplied by
100
Proportion state GDP from
farming, multiplied by 100
Lost agricultural profits, in
billions
Average state latitude
Water risk, divided by 10
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
GDP per capita, divided by
10,000
Constant
Observations
R-squared

EPA, 0
otherwise
0.294*
(0.155)
0.459**
(0.205)
-0.115
(0.160)
0.061
(0.183)
0.074
(0.439)
-0.045
(0.457)
-0.034
(0.209)
0.007
(0.011)
0.002
(0.039)
0.140
(1.035)
0.081
(0.122)
-0.703
(0.519)
50
0.598

(2)
1 if ConEPA, 0
otherwise
-0.389***
(0.107)
-0.045
(0.162)
-0.006
(0.161)
0.427**
(0.199)
-0.449
(0.473)
0.509
(0.492)
0.171
(0.152)
0.006
(0.013)
-0.030
(0.026)
-2.088**
(0.990)
-0.184*
(0.107)
1.748***
(0.452)
50
0.713

(3)
1 if ProEPA, 0 if
Con-EPA
0.381**
(0.144)
0.476*
(0.249)
-0.135
(0.137)
-0.102
(0.198)
-0.126
(0.383)
0.144
(0.403)
-0.032
(0.164)
0.012
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.034)
-0.129
(1.240)
0.112
(0.110)
-0.725*
(0.408)
37
0.818

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 and discussion in this
for
definitions of variables. Regional controls for Northeast, South, and West are
Section
included, but not reported, with Midwest as the omitted category. The coefficients on the regional
controls are not statistically significant. Missing variable indicators for lost agricultural profits
and water risk are also included in the regressions and are statistically significant in
specifications (2) and (3).
p < 0.10.
*
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
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2. Carbon Dioxide Emissions
I replace the emissions rate variable with total carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions per capita for each state. I create this variable by
dividing the EPA's measure by Census population data. Its effect is in
the same direction as the emissions rate variable, but its coefficient is
never statistically significant. My main qualitative results do not
change, but the coefficient on the agricultural risk variable becomes
statistically significant at the ten percent level in specification (1),
suggesting that states with a higher proportion of GDP from farming
are more likely to enter to support the EPA.
TABLE 6. CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.

(1)
Independent Variables
Democratic attorney general
Blue state in 2008
Carbon dioxide emissions (tons)
per capita, divided by 100
State has a seacoast
Proportion state GDP from
farming, multiplied by 10
Average state latitude
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
Constant
Observations
R-squared

1 if ProEPA, 0
otherwise
0.337***
(0.121)
0.513***
(0.173)
-0.314

(0.228)
0.073
(0.147)
0.467*
(0.236)
0.011
(0.011)
-0.113
(0.729)
-0.893*
(0.469)
50
0.581

(2)
1 if ConEPA, 0
otherwise
-0.500***
(0.099)
-0.254
(0.167)
0.014
(0.330)
0.345**
(0.153)
0.126
(0.328)
-0.009
(0.012)
-1.177
(0.897)
1.802***
(0.533)
50
0.637

(3)
1 if ProEPA, 0 if
Con-EPA
0.421***
(0.127)
0.543**
(0.210)
-0.382
(0.440)

-0.156
(0.153)
0.299
(0.352)
0.011
(0.012)
-0.237
(0.868)
-0.860
(0.513)

37
0.775

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 and discussion in this
Section for definitions of variables. State GDP per capita and regional controls for Northeast,
South, and West (with Midwest as the omitted category) are included but not reported; the
coefficients are statistically insignificant.
p < 0.1 0.
*
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
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3. Public Opinion
Because there is no reliable state-by-state measure of public
opinion on climate change mitigation strategies, I create multiple
proxies for state public opinion. In this Section, I describe the proxies
for public opinion that I did not report in my main analysis. I also
show how the choice of public opinion proxy does not change my
qualitative results regarding the robust effect of politics.
My first alternative measure of state public opinion on climate
change mitigation is a state average of individuals' responses to a
question from a national survey specifically asking about support for
climate change mitigation policies. 8 9 The disadvantage of using this
variable is that some states-Alaska, Delaware, and Hawaii-have no
responses, requiring me to use a missing variable indicator.
Furthermore, some states have only a few responses making the
public opinion proxy potentially unrepresentative despite the random
selection of respondents. This is because the survey's goal was to
select a nationally representative sample using the least amount of
survey respondents and not necessarily to select a representative
sample of residents from each state.
In order to decrease the effects of unrepresentative samples for
some states, I also generate an average state public support index
based on multiple polling data on climate change attitudes, which is a
method used by the research group led by Sammy Zahran. 190 This
attitude index is the average of the results from five questions relating
to climate change mitigation from three different national polls. 191

189. ABC News/Washington Post Monthly Poll, December 2009, INTER-UNIVERSITY
CONSORTIUM FOR POL. & Soc. RESEARCH, at question 25 [hereinafter ABC News December 2009]
("On another subject, do you think the federal government should or should not regulate the
release of greenhouse gases from sources like power plants, cars and factories in an effort to
reduce global warming? [GET ANSWER THEN ASK] Do you feel that way STRONGLY or
SOMEWHAT?"). I grouped "strongly should" and "somewhat should" responses together as
indicators of support for mitigation strategies and then collapsed the results by state.
190. Zahran et al., supra note 69.
191. See ABC News December 2009, supra note 189; NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll,
December 2009, Past Decade/Economy/Afghanistan/Health, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP.
RESEARCH, at question 40 ("From what you know about global climate change or global warming,
which one of the following statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) Global climate change
has been established as a serious problem, and immediate action is necessary;
(2)
there
is
enough evidence that climate change is taking place and some action should be taken;
(3)
we
don't know enough about global climate change, and more research is necessary before we take
any actions; or (4) concern about global climate change is unwarranted."); id. at question 41 ("I'm
going to read you two statements. Please tell me whether the first statement or the second
statement comes closer to your own view, even if neither is exactly right. Statement A: Global
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Despite drawing information from more polls and questions, average
public opinion for Hawaii and Alaska is still based on only two polls,
so the attitude score is still potentially unrepresentative of public
opinion in those states.
My third alternative proxy for public support is the news
visibility variable described in Part II.A.3. The assumption behind this
variable as a proxy for climate change support is that "all news is good
news," which is an arguable assumption.
Finally, I generate two other variables: the proportion of
environmental organization members from a representative national
survey of 5,213 respondents and the percent who voted for Ralph
Nader in the 2000 election. I create the first variable from the same
survey as the self-described environmentalist variable that I use in
the main analysis. 192 The second variable uses the fact that Ralph
Nader ran as a Green Party candidate in the 2000 election. This
variable, however, is missing data from North Carolina, Oklahoma,
and South Dakota, which did not have Ralph Nader on the ballot. 193
I create these alternative measures of public opinion in order to
convince the reader that my results are robust to my choice of public
opinion measure. The coefficients on public opinion proxies are never
significant in the regressions, excepting the one instance in Table 5.
Table 7 summarizes the coefficients on the public opinion variables
after separate regressions using the main specifications. Hence, Table
7 summarizes eighteen separate regressions. The qualitative results
do not change, regardless of which public opinion measure I use. I
chose to use the proportion of self-described environmentalists in my
main analysis.

warming is caused more by human actions than by naturally occurring forces. Statement B:
Global warming is caused more by naturally occurring forces than by human actions. (IF
RESPONDENT CHOOSES, ASK:) Do you feel that way very strongly or not strongly?"); USA
Today/Gallup Poll:December 2009 Wave 1, ROPER CTR. FOR PUB. OP. RESEARCH, at question 21
("As you may know, representatives from around the world are gathering for a United Nations
conference on global climate change in Copenhagen. Do you favor or oppose the U.S. signing a
binding global treaty at the Copenhagen meeting that would require the U.S. to significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions? (1) Favor; or (2) oppose."); id. at question 23 ("Which worries
you more? (1) That the U.S. will NOT take the actions necessary to prevent the catastrophic
effects of global warming because of fears those actions would harm the economy; or (2) that the
U.S. WILL take actions to protect against global warming and those actions will cripple the U.S.
economy."). Where relevant, I grouped "strongly" and "somewhat strongly" pro and against
responses together to create binary indicators of support and opposition.
192. See supra note 120.
193. Presidential Election of 2000, Electoral and Popular Vote Summary, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.comlipa1A0876793.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2012).
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TABLE 7. PUBLIC OPINION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
(3)
(1)
(2)
1 if Pro1 if Pro1 if ConIndependent Variables
Survey support for climate
change mitigation
Survey attitude index
News visibility
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
Proportion members in an
environmental organization
Percent voting for Nader in
2000
Observations

EPA, 0

EPA, 0

EPA, 0 if

otherwise
-0.133
(0.188)
-0.181
(0.530)
0.118
(0.274)
-0.298
(0.739)
0.775
(1.274)
0.024
(0.045)
50

otherwise
0.051
(0.224)
0.532
(0.397)
-0.013
(0.216)
-0.793
(0.909)
-1.611
(1.004)
0.024
(0.040)
50

Con-EPA
-0.011
(0.171)
-0.105
(0.414)
-0.106
(0.248)
-0.802
(0.863)
0.880
(0.996)
-0.042
(0.044)
37

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 and discussion in this
Section for definitions of variables. Each alternative public opinion proxy is included in a
separate regression that also includes all variables in regressions summarized in Table 4.
Missing variable indicators for climate change mitigation support and percent voting for Nader
are included and statistically insignificant. The qualitative results for the other variables do not
change with the public opinion measure.
p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.

4. Demographic Variables
I create a variable indicating the percent of persons twenty-five
years old and older that had a bachelor's degree or more in 2008, as
reported in Census data.19 4 This state education variable is correlated
with state GDP per capita (69.49 percent), and its inclusion does not
affect the qualitative results.
In addition, in all specifications, I include regional dummies for
the South, West, Northeast, and Midwest to ensure that the seacoast
variable is not driven by regional preferences in the southern states.
The regional controls are not statistically significant and do not affect

194. The 2012 Statistical Abstract: State Rankings, U.S. CENSUS
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/rankings.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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the coefficient of the seacoast variable. The inclusion of the regional
variables in the main analysis does, however, decrease the magnitude
and increase the standard errors of the emission rate variable; its
coefficient becomes insignificant in specification (1). The carbon
dioxide emission rate may be correlated with region (carbon dioxide
heavy industries tend to locate near each other). 195 Table 8 reports the
main results when I exclude the regional controls.
TABLE 8. REGIONAL CONTROL SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.
(2)
(3)
(1)
1 if Pro1 if Con1 if ProEPA, 0 if
EPA, 0
EPA, 0
Con-EPA
otherwise
otherwise
Independent Variables
-0.493***
0.430***
0.348***
Democratic attorney general
(0.115)
(0.100)
(0.103)
-0.240*
0.502***
0.514***
Blue state in 2008
(0.173)
(0.142)
(0.136)
-0.253**
-0.220**
0.218
Carbon dioxide emission rate,
(0.115)
(0.138)
(0.107)
divided by 1,000
-0.214
0.442***
0.048
a
seacoast
State has
(0.166)
(0.137)
(0.158)
0.020
0.293
0.281
Proportion state GDP from
(0.216)
(0.234)
(0.203)
farming, multiplied by 10
0.008
-0.009
0.010
Average state latitude
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.008)
-0.336
-0.675
-0.370
Proportion self-described
(0.790)
(0.869)
(0.690)
environmentalists
0.148**
-0.114
0.081
GDP per capita, divided by
(0.072)
(0.073)
(0.089)
10,000
-0.342
1.337***
-0.430
Constant
(0.379)
(0.493)
(0.417)
37
50
50
Observations
0.764
0.632
0.580
R-squared
NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 for definitions of
variables. These regressions exclude regional controls.
p < 0.10.
*
** p < 0.05.
1
p < 0.0 .

195. See Cragg & Kahn, supra note 91, at 4-7 (discussing the uneven distribution of carbon
dioxide-heavy regions in the United States).
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5. Political Measures
In Table 9, I replace the binary variable indicating the state's
position in the 2008 presidential election with a variable reporting the
difference between the Democratic and Republican votes in the same
election to account for the strength of the state's political preferences.
This change diminishes the coefficient of the carbon dioxide emission
rate, which becomes insignificant in specification (3).196
TABLE 9. DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN GAP SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.

Independent Variables
Democratic attorney general
Democrat-minus-Republican
percent votes in 2008 election
Carbon dioxide emission rate,
divided by 1,000
State has a seacoast
Proportion state GDP from
farming, multiplied by 10
Average state latitude

(1)
1 if ProEPA, 0
otherwise
0.263*
(0.134)
0.014**

(0.005)
-0.157
(0.129)
-0.026
(0.168)
0.193
(0.260)
0.015

(0.014)
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
GDP per capita, divided by
10,000
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-0.401
(1.109)
0.078

(0.095)
-0.430
(0.417)
50
0.580

(2)
1 if ConEPA, 0
otherwise
-0.479***
(0.104)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.161
(0.144)
0.429**
(0.191)
0.327
(0.280)
-0.007
(0.012)
-1.152
(0.926)
-0.107
(0.073)
1.337***
(0.493)
50
0.632

(3)
1 if ProEPA, 0 if
Con-EPA
0.419***
(0.144)
0.009
(0.006)
-0.140
(0.151)
-0.216
(0.228)
-0.149
(0.298)
0.009
(0.013)
0.552
(0.959)
0.107
(0.080)
-0.342
(0.379)
37
0.764

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 and discussion in this
Section for variable definitions. Regional controls are included but not reported.
*
P < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*
p < 0.01.

196. The carbon dioxide emission rate is somewhat correlated with the Democrat-Republican
gap (-0.3493) and being a blue state in the 2008 election (-0.2856).
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As a final robustness check, I replace the variable indicating
the attorney general's affiliation with a variable for the governor's
political affiliation. The coefficient on the governor's affiliation is
smaller in magnitude and insignificant in specifications (1) and (3), as
compared to the attorney general's affiliation. In specification (3), the
regional controls for the Northeast and West and the seacoast variable
become statistically significant at the ten percent level; 197 otherwise,
all of the results are qualitatively the same. When I include both in
the regression, however, the coefficient on governor affiliation becomes
statistically significant and negative in specification (1). This means
that controlling for a Democratic attorney general and being a blue
state, a Democratic governor is associated with a decreased likelihood
of a state entering the litigation in support of the EPA. This
anomalous result suggests that the governor's affiliation does not
determine the decision to enter litigation on behalf of the state. 198 In
addition, the coefficient on the carbon dioxide emission rate loses
statistical significance, the coefficient on the regional control for the
West becomes significant in specification (3), and the coefficient on the
agricultural risk variable gains significance in specification (1).
Otherwise, the inclusion of the governor's affiliation does not change
the main qualitative results.

197. The magnitude of the coefficient on the seacoast variable is still in the direction
opposite to predictions.
198. The governor's affiliation might affect the decision to terminate litigation on
behalf of the state, however. I base this idea on the experience of Pennsylvania, which
terminated its involvement in the greenhouse gas litigation after its new governor, a Republican,
took office. See discussion supra notes 59, 88.
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TABLE 10. GOVERNOR AFFILIATION
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS.

Independent Varia bles
Democratic attorney general
Governor is a Democrat
Blue state in 2008
Carbon dioxide emission rate,
divided by 1,000
State has a seacoast
Proportion state GDP from
farming, multiplied by 10
Average state latitude
Proportion self-described
environmentalists
GDP per capita, divided by
10,000
Constant

(1)

(2)

(3)

1 ifPro-

1 if Con-

1 if ProEPA, 0 if
Con-EPA

EPA, 0

EPA, 0

otherwise
0.437***
(0.113)
-0.276**
(0.130)
0.617***
(0.171)
-0.085
(0.131)
-0.014
(0.158)
0.542**
(0.244)
0.016
(0.011)
-0.062
(0.799)
0.077
(0.091)
-1.070*

otherwise
-0.484***

(0.552)
Observations
R-squared

50
0.637

(0.107)
-0.039
(0.131)
-0.244
(0.161)
0.175
(0.141)
0.411**
(0.171)
0.185
(0.302)
-0.007
(0.011)
-0.760
(0.925)
-0.092
(0.071)
1.388**
(0.645)
50
0.653

0.437***
(0.126)
-0.124
(0.122)
0.651***
(0.205)
-0.192
(0.132)
-0.264
(0.189)
0.432
(0.333)
0.013
(0.011)
-0.797
(0.972)
0.159*
(0.078)
-0.756
(0.553)
37
0.801

NOTES. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. See Table 2 and discussion in this
Section for variable definitions. Regional controls for Northeast, South, and West are included,
but not reported, with Midwest as the omitted category. The coefficients on the regional controls
are not statistically significant, excepting the coefficient on the West in specification (3).
*
p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.

